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I. INTRODUCTION 
The implied warranty of habitability has been called the “most promi-
nent result” of the revolution in tenant rights that arose in the 1960s and 
1970s.1 A leading treatise on property law calls the adoption of the implied 
warranty “the most dramatic and sudden change in [landlord- tenant] law in 
modern times . . . .”2 How has the revolution fared after forty-plus years?  
How have courts responded to the shift from examining the landlord-tenant 
relationship under the doctrines of contract in the place of property law? 
This article examines some of the issues that courts are addressing today 
with regard to the implied warranty of habitability. The article will begin 
with a historical discussion of the warranty’s rise to provide context for how 
truly revolutionary its adoption was. Then, jumping forward, cases address-
ing the implied warranty over the last twelve years will be examined to pro-
vide context to discuss unresolved questions that remain. The purpose of 
this article is to provide a snapshot of the state of the implied warranty to-
day, so that when soldiers fighting in the landlord-tenant revolution forty 
years from now look back, they have some understanding of how the battle 
lines of this generation were drawn. 
The article begins in Part I with a discussion of the historical roots of 
landlord-tenant relationship—from the doctrine of caveat emptor to the 
adoption of the implied warranty of habitability. Part II, analyzing reported 
cases between 2000 and 2012, looks at whether the definition of “habitabil-
ity” in the implied warranty of habitability has evolved or shifted since the 
warranty was first adopted. Part III shifts to how statutory implied warran-
ties of habitability (as expressed for example in the Uniform Residential 
Landlord Tenant Act) interact—or perhaps counteract—the common law 
implied warranty of habitability. Part IV questions whether the implied war-
ranty of habitability is a legal doctrine at all, or whether it is an equitable 
doctrine dressed in legal (contractual) garb.   
  
 1. David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 CAL. 
L. REV. 389, 392 (2011) (“The late 1960s and early 1970s saw wide-ranging changes in ten-
ants’ rights.  The civil rights movement led to prohibitions on racial discrimination.  Federal 
housing programs began subsidizing rents in privately owned buildings; landlords accepting 
those subsidies were required to afford tenants a host of new rights.  Some jurisdictions im-
posed rent control, prohibited eviction without just cause, limited condominium conversions, 
or authorized receiverships for ill-maintained rental housing.  The most prominent result of 
the revolution, however, was reading an implied warranty of habitability into residential 
leases . . . . These measures, eventually adopted in almost every state, seemed to reverse the 
landlord’s historical dominance in the landlord-tenant relationship.”). 
 2. William B. Stoebuck & Dale A. Whitman, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 299 (3d ed. 
2000). 
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II. THE ADOPTION OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY 
Viewed through the lens of property law—with its unwavering focus 
on certainty and consistency—recognition of the implied warranty of habit-
ability in the late 1960s and early 1970s seems too radical to believe.  After 
all, the doctrine it replaced—caveat emptor—had stood the test of time 
since the 1500’s.3 To understand how this revolutionary shift occurred re-
quires looking at historical, political, cultural, and legal circumstances fac-
ing landlords and tenants over time. 
Developed during feudal times, the idea that a landowner would put 
someone else in possession of the land for a period of time—transferring 
less than absolute ownership—was something of an anomaly. Was the 
agreement to transfer land a contract-based relationship or a property-based 
one? Blackstone describes leases as “estates less than freehold” and defines 
a lease for a term as “a contract for the possession of land or tenements, for 
a determinate period.”4 In that definition is both the estate language of prop-
erty and the covenant language of contract.  Early on the issue was further 
complicated by the fact that while the conveyance was for land (and in those 
days land was of primary importance), the transaction itself was based on a 
loan agreement between a landowner and a creditor.5 In the transaction, the 
creditor would receive an estate for years in return for loaning a sum of 
money to the landowner. The creditor was repaid through the fruits of the 
land—the rent.6 In this transaction the relationship between the landlord and 
tenant could be viewed as either one of contract or one of property (or both).  
English courts (and American courts following the English lead) chose 
to label the leasehold relationship as one based in property law.7 It was 
thought the transfer could not be contractual because the law of contracts 
did not recognize the inherent rights held in a leasehold estate—namely the 
transfer of title during the term with the landowner retaining the right of 
  
 3. See Gardiner v. William S. Butler & Co., 245 U.S. 603, 604 (1918) (Holmes, J.) 
(“But the law as to leases is not a matter of logic in vacuo; it is a matter of history that has not 
forgotten Lord Coke.”). 
 4. William Blackstone, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *141. 
 5. Thomas F. Bergin & Paul G. Haskell, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE 
INTERESTS 40 (2d ed. 1984). 
 6. Id. 
 7. This property-based approach was adopted in the 1200’s as the rights associated 
with a tenancy shifted from one based on the relationship between the landlord and the tenant 
to one based on the relationship between the tenant and the land.  As Tiffany puts it, “It was 
thus that the interest of a grantee for years came gradually to be regarded, not as a mere right 
of action resting on a covenant by the lessor, but as a right of property enforceable against 
any wrongdoer by a remedy analogous to that to which the owner of a freehold is entitled.” 
Herbert T. Tiffany, 1 THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND OTHER INTERESTS IN LAND § 38 
(1920). 
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reversion8 In addition, while a contract could be invalid for lack of consider-
ation, a leasehold estate could be conveyed with no consideration at all.9 
The problems and complications of categorizing the landlord-tenant re-
lationship as based in property remained hidden for generations because 
viewing the transfer of a leasehold interest as a “sale” of an interest in the 
land for a time benefited both parties. The landlord wanted rent and the 
agrarian tenant wanted to ensure undisturbed possession of the property for 
the length of the term.10 A transaction based in property did just that—the 
landlord relinquished right to possession and use of the land. The tenant, 
however, gained the land and the right to be free from landlord interfer-
ence.11 There was no expectation that the landlord warranted that any struc-
tures on the property were in any particular condition. Tenants were ex-
pected to examine the property before renting it and thereafter took the 
property as they found it.12 Thus, the doctrine of caveat emptor was born. 
In addition to caveat emptor, the categorization of leases as based in 
property had another significant and related consequence. Because the trans-
fer of the land itself was the most valuable part of the transfer, other cove-
nants included in the lease were considered incidental to and independent of 
the interest in land.13 While the principle of dependent obligations developed 
in contract law, the concept was foreign to the law of property.14 Therefore, 
  
 8. Herbert T. Tiffany, 1 THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 16 (1910) (“The fun-
damental objection to [a contract theory] of a lease is that it entirely ignores the common-law 
theory of a particular and a reversionary estate in the lessee and lessor respectively, and sub-
stitutes therefor the civil concept of a contract of hiring . . . which passes no title or property 
in the thing hired, but merely binds the owner . . . to secure the enjoyment of the thing to the 
hirer.”). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Blackstone, supra note 4, at *141(“These estates were originally granted to mere 
farmers or husbandmen, who every year rendered some equivalent in money, provisions, or 
other rent, to the lessors or landlords; but, in order to encourage them to manure and cultivate 
the ground, they had a permanent interest granted them, not determinable at the will of the 
lord.”). 
 11. John L. Zenor, Judicial Expansion of the Tenants’ Private Law Rights: Implied 
Warranties of Habitability and Safety in Residential Urban Leases, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 489, 
490 (1970) (“The common law focused on possession rather than service.  The ideal landlord 
delivered possession, then did nothing more; the ideal tenant paid his rent and demanded 
nothing more than possession.”). 
 12. Bowe v. Hunking, 135 Mass. 380, 383–84 (1883) (“A tenant is a purchaser of an 
estate in the land or building hired; and . . . no action lies by a tenant against a landlord on 
account of the condition of the premises hired, in the absence of an express warranty or of 
active deceit . . . . This is the general rule of caveat emptor.”).   
 13. Bettina B. Plevan, Contract Principles and Leases of Realty, 50 B.U. L. REV. 24, 26 
(1970). 
 14. Stoebuck & Whitman, supra note 2, at § 6.10; (“A lease was usually spoken of as a 
conveyance and not a contract. An important consequence was that, when the law of contract 
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because any claim for breach of a contractual provision was deemed inde-
pendent, the parties were not allowed to refrain from satisfying their obliga-
tions under the lease merely because the other party failed to perform.15 As a 
result, the tenant’s obligation to pay rent was for the right of continuing pos-
session of the estate/land—it was not contingent or dependent upon the 
landlord doing anything.16 This meant that even if the landlord expressly 
agreed in the lease to keep the premises in a habitable condition, a breach of 
that agreement would not relieve the tenant from having to pay rent.   
The historical foundations on which the caveat emptor and dependent 
covenants doctrines were based came under attack in the mid-1800s.17 The 
presumptions no longer held. The emphasis on land and the independence of 
covenants began to appear one-sided and subject to abuse. Because these 
doctrines fulfilled the expectations of the parties when they were adopted, 
early courts cannot be blamed for looking to property principles to govern 
the landlord-tenant relationships. However, the consequences of this catego-
rization, and the “formalistic, box-like structure” of property law—in which 
rights are automatically determined by rules whose justifications may be 
long past their relevance—began to come under increased criticism.18 
A.  Caveat Emptor Comes Under Attack:  Constructive Eviction 
The first judicially-created crack in the caveat emptor doctrine was 
based on the warranty implied in every lease—the tenant’s right to quiet 
enjoyment. This move had the advantage of being consistent with the prop-
erty-based view of the leasehold arrangement. The common law implied an 
  
developed the concept of dependency of covenants . . ., that remedy was not a traditional part 
of landlord-tenant law . . . .”). 
 15. Tiffany, supra note 8, at § 51 (“The modern tendency . . . , in reference to contracts 
generally is to construe promises as dependent on each other when they form the whole con-
sideration for each other, but this criterion would seem to be inapplicable to covenants in 
leases, since the making of the demise itself, that is, the grant of an estate in the land, ordinar-
ily enters into the consideration.”). 
 16. Thomas M. Quinn & Earl Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evalua-
tion of the Past With Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 228 (1969) (“Sig-
nificantly, the landlord was not being paid to do anything. He was turning over the land to the 
tenant with the rent serving as continuous compensation for the transfer. The landlord was 
not expected to assist in the operation of the land. Quite the reverse, he was expected to stay 
as far away as possible.”).   
 17. John S. Grimes, Caveat Lessee, 2 VAL. U. L. REV. 189, 190 (Spring 1968) (“The 
sloth of our new law has permitted rules formulated too often by dynastic struggles in English 
history to filter our social growth. Typical of this legal inadequacy is the long lot of human 
misery created by the application of the concept of caveat emptor to the relationship of land-
lord and tenant.”).  
 18. Curtis J. Berger & Joan C. Williams, PROPERTY: LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 211 (4th 
ed. 1997). 
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obligation on the part of the landlord to not disturb the quiet enjoyment of 
the tenant—just as it did in the transfer of a fee simple estate.19 This tradi-
tionally meant that the landlord could not improperly physically evict the 
tenant.   
Courts had little trouble extending the violation of the right to quiet en-
joyment to partial eviction—when, as a result of the landlord’s actions, the 
tenant was unable to occupy a portion of the leased premises. In the case of 
a partial eviction, courts held that the landlord had breached the covenant of 
quiet enjoyment and the tenant was excused from paying rent on the entire 
premises because the landlord should not be permitted to apportion his 
wrong.20 For example, where the landlord sold part of the leased premises to 
a railroad company and the company put down tracks making it impossible 
for the tenant to utilize all of the leased property, the tenant was excused 
from paying any rent.21 
While actual, physical ouster was the clearest example of this type of 
eviction, some courts were willing to go further by expanding the meaning 
of “eviction.” What if the landlord did not physically remove the tenant 
from all or part of the premises, but made conditions on the premises too 
difficult so as to constructively evict the tenant? The foundational case in 
this regard is Dyett v. Pendleton from New York.22 In that case, the tenant 
complained that the landlord allowed prostitutes to utilize portions of a 
house where the tenant rented a room. The tenant argued that the visitors 
disturbed his possession by making a “great deal of indecent noise and dis-
turbance . . . often screaming extravagantly . . . frequently using obscene and 
vulgar language so loud as to be understood at a considerable distance.”23 
The court held that while there was no actual eviction of the tenant from 
even a portion of the leased premises, the landlord’s actions (allowing the 
noisy visitors to utilize portions of the house) made continued occupation by 
the tenant so untenable that it was as if the landlord had physically evicted 
the tenant. In such a situation the tenant, after vacating the premises, could 
defend a suit by the landlord for rent by arguing he was constructively evict-
ed.  
Courts were hesitant to expand the concept of constructive eviction too 
far, and adopted a number of elements to ensure it was only applied in ex-
treme situations. Thus, courts required the tenant to demonstrate the condi-
tion was attributable to the landlord or her agent (and not a third party),24 
creating an intentional and substantial interference with the tenant’s enjoy-
  
 19. Tiffany, supra note 8, at § 16. 
 20. See Giraud v. Milovich, 85 P.2d 182 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1938). 
 21. Halligan v. Wade, 21 Ill. 470  (Ill. 1859). 
 22. Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. 1826). 
 23. Id. at 735–36. 
 24. Sanders v. Allen, 188 P.2d 760, 763 (1948). 
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ment of the premises,25 and that, as a result of the unbearable condition, the 
tenant vacated the premises within a reasonable time after the condition 
arose.26 
This last element—abandonment—was logical when considering that 
the defense arose as a limited expansion under the property-based landlord-
tenant regime and the right of the tenant to be free from eviction by her 
landlord..27 The evolution of the concept of eviction to recognize construc-
tive eviction provided tenants an additional remedy, but it was soon discov-
ered that the doctrine was insufficient to address growing concerns over 
substandard condition of rental property.28 
B. The Revolution Succeeds: Recognition of the Common Law Implied 
Warranty of Habitability 
The rise of the industrial revolution and the movement of individuals to 
cities and factories from the farm meant that tenants were entering into the 
lease agreement with a new set of expectations. Tenants no longer wanted 
the land and to be left alone, but instead sought safe and secure housing. The 
combination of the landlord-friendly caveat emptor doctrine combined with 
housing shortages in cities meant that the right to claim constructive evic-
tion, which had been premised on the “extreme verge” of rights when adopt-
ed, became an inadequate if not useless remedy.29 After all, to take ad-
vantage of a constructive eviction defense, the tenant had to leave the prem-
ises. In a housing shortage, such an option was unlikely.30 In addition, con-
  
 25. Lindenberg v. MacDonald, 214 P.2d 5, 9 (Cal. 1950); see Tregoning v. Reynolds, 28 
P.2d 79, 80 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1934); see also Kelley v. Long, 122 P. 832, 834 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1912). 
 26. Lori, Ltd., v. Wolfe, 192 P.2d 112, 119 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948) (stating that ten-
ants must be forced to vacate a property for constructive eviction to occur); see also Coen v. 
City of Los Angeles, 234 P. 426, 431 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1925) (stating that no matter how 
much a tenant’s enjoyment is disturbed, constructive eviction only takes place when a tenant 
is forced to leave a property). 
 27. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 16, at 236 (“[Constructive eviction] appeared very 
traditional.  The law was not talking about the landlord’s failure to supply services, but rather 
of his obligation to assure quiet possession.  That was the old idea, and that was what trig-
gered the old remedy, i.e., the tenant’s power to abate the rent by leaving the premises.”).  
 28. Peter Simmons, Passion and Prudence: Rent Withholding Under New York’s Spie-
gel Law, 15 BUFF. L. REV. 572, 577 (1965) (“Slum tenants, though, are unlikely to find mean-
ingful protection in [the constructive eviction] doctrine; long term residential leases are un-
common, and the requirement that the tenant must vacate the premises offers little more than 
the alternative of quitting one substandard unit for another.”). 
 29. Notes of Recent Decisions, 38 CENT. L.J. 403, 403 (1894). 
 30. Buoncristiani, Notes: Partial Constructive Eviction: The Common Law Answer in 
the Tenant’s Struggle for Habitability, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 417, 417-18 (1969) (“The pressures 
of the 20th century have substantially negated the effectiveness of constructive eviction as a 
tenant remedy. The expanding population, the migration to urban areas and the ensuing hous-
 
800 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35  
structive eviction operated as a defense in a claim for unpaid rent by their 
landlord. Tenants ran the risk that a court would determine that the land-
lord’s actions were not sufficient to satisfy the elements of constructive 
eviction—putting the tenant on the hook for the cost of the new residence as 
well as the abandoned lease.31 
While courts were struggling with expanding and reevaluating tenant 
rights in respect to traditional common law concepts, other branches of gov-
ernment were acting to alleviate what was viewed as public health and safe-
ty concerns of substandard and unhealthy living conditions. To address these 
concerns, local governments (beginning with New York City in 1901) en-
acted housing and building codes. These codes set out minimum health and 
safety standards for construction and occupancy. The presence of the codes 
moved from sporadic enactments in large cities to almost universal adoption 
across the United States between 1956 and 1968—as adoption of codes be-
came a prerequisite for obtaining federal funds.32 There were high hopes that 
these codes would alleviate substandard housing.33 If landlords faced crimi-
nal sanctions for failing to maintain their property in a habitable condition, 
the reasoning went, they (and their landlord colleagues) would have an in-
centive to ensure that their properties were maintained.34 However, in prac-
tice, building codes did not live up to these theoretical assumptions.35 
  
ing shortage have made the tenant’s procurement of adequate housing difficult, if not impos-
sible.  Consequently, the tenant is likely to accept certain inadequacies rather than expend 
more for proper accommodations, or struggle to find better housing in the same price range. 
Thus, many tenants are currently enduring conditions that might well constitute a basis for 
constructive eviction.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 163 N.E.2d 4, 8 (Mass. 1959). 
See also Buoncristiani, supra note 30, at 427 (“Even if the tenant does elect to avail himself 
of constructive eviction, the same factors that force other tenants to endure also operate to 
make the recourse somewhat of a gamble.  If the tenant removes and it is later judicially 
determined that he did so without cause, he remains liable on the lease in addition to incur-
ring the expense of finding new habitation.”). 
 32. Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and 
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 551-52 (1983) (discussing the evolution of the 
adoption of local housing codes). 
 33. Daniel N. Loeb, The Low-Income Tenant in California: A Study in Frustration, 21 
HASTINGS L.J. 287, 293-97 (1969) (discussing the limitations of housing code enforcement 
from the perspective of the low-income tenant). 
 34. For example, in St. Louis, Missouri, an uncorrected building code violation could 
result in a fine of up to $500 and imprisonment of up to 90 days. St. Louis Ordinance # 
51637, Section 4 (1963).  Revised Code of St. Louis, Section 1.100. 
 35. Brian J. Strum, Proposed Uniform Landlord and Tenant Act: A Departure from 
Traditional Concepts, 8 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 495, 498 (Fall 1973) (collecting articles); 
see also id. at 498 (“The search for an acceptable and workable method of requiring landlords 
to maintain habitable dwellings has continued for many years.  At first, a building and hous-
ing code which imposed penalties on landlords where buildings failed to meet the prescribed 
standards were thought to be the answer, but the desired result has not been achieved.”). 
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There were a number of reasons for the failure. Some statutes provided 
that landlords had an obligation to maintain premises unless the parties con-
tracted around it. Such provisions, while putting laws on the books, became 
ineffectual in practice for all but the most unsophisticated landlord.36 In ad-
dition, building code procedures presumed that there were other options 
available to tenants. For example, under the New York City Tenement 
Housing Act of 1901, the remedy was for the agency in charge of adminis-
tering the statute to issue a “vacate” order on those premises that were found 
to violate the building code requirements.37 The building was to remain va-
cant until sufficient repairs were made.38 As housing became more and more 
scarce, the vacate remedy became less effective because tenants—vacated 
from their home and unable to find other accommodations—faced a catch-
22.39 In addition, government officials were hesitant to enforce building 
code violations that had the effect of putting all tenants out onto the street.40 
Finally, by placing the obligation of enforcement solely in the hands of gov-
ernment officials (as opposed to a tenant), a “lack of manpower, inefficien-
cy, corruption, or mere indifference”41 created obstacles to the overall goal 
of improving leased premises.42 Enforcement was described as “too slow, 
too weak, or non-existent.”43 The fact that violations of building codes car-
ried criminal penalties resulted in a double disadvantage. First, courts were 
hesitant to impose stiff criminal penalties (crime or jail time) for housing 
code violations. Second, when fines were imposed, landlords had an incen-
tive to pay the fine instead of remedying the condition on the premises and 
merely considering the fine a cost of doing business. Rather than rendering 
the premises habitable, landlords instead considered paying the fine as mere-
ly a cost of doing business.44 In short, the criminal-ordinance based ap-
proach to addressing premises conditions did not work.45 
  
 36. Buoncristiani, supra note 30, at 417-18. 
 37. William E. Marshall, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant in Substandard Housing–
Past, Present, Future, 6 WAKE FOREST INTRAMURAL L. REV. 119, 120 (1970). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 120-21. 
 40. Charles Donahue, Jr., Change in the American Law of Landlord and Tenant, 37 
MOD. L. REV. 242, 251 (May 1974). 
 41. Zenor, supra note 11, at 492. 
 42. Zenor, supra note 11, at 492. 
 43. Marshall, supra note 37, at 120; see also Kenneth A. Neal, The New Michigan Land-
lord-Tenant Law: Partial Answer to a Perplexing Problem, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 836, 850 
(1968) (noting that putting the decision of what conditions are sufficiently poor to justify 
pursuing under a building code enforcement regime is an unnecessarily paternalistic ap-
proach).   
 44. Zenor, supra note 11, at 492; Neal, supra note 43, at 837. 
 45. Judah Gribetz & Frank P. Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Reme-
dies, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1254, 1256 (1966) (“The trouble with criminal prosecution for hous-
ing violations . . . is that in hard-core cases it does not work.  The remedy is inadequate as a 
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Housing codes did not eliminate substandard housing as their early 
proponents predicted. They did, however, provide evidence that state and 
local governments recognized that rental units were being maintained in 
substandard conditions and that, as a matter of public policy, the responsibil-
ity for maintaining properties in a structurally sound condition should be 
placed on the landlord. The question then became, how did these codified 
obligations impact the legal relationship between the landlord and tenant? 
Do they indicate an obligation on behalf of the landlord beyond merely 
avoiding actions that constitute an actual or constructive eviction? There 
were three approaches to these questions. The first was that the presence of 
the codes created no private right of action and that violations were to be 
handled through the enforcement mechanism, with the relationship of the 
landlord and tenant remaining static.46 
The second approach relied on the laissez faire economic doctrine and 
viewed the codes as irrelevant to risk allocation in a lease agreement. For 
these courts, even though the relationship between landlord and tenant may 
have no longer resembled the agriculturally-centered relationship that it had 
in the past, the primacy of the right to contract trumped the need to impose 
additional obligations on the landlord. According to this philosophy, tenants 
and landlords entered into a contract at arm’s length and if the tenant wanted 
greater protection, such as being ensured a habitable premises, they should 
negotiate for it: 
According to this fiction, courts are not called upon to perform any nec-
essary social function in reforming landlord and tenant law because the 
parties to a lease are fully able to protect their own interests and to secure 
the terms and conditions which they wish. If a tenant lives in an unsafe 
or unhealthy dwelling it must be because he wishes to do so; if the tenant 
did not approve the condition of the premises he would have bargained 
with the landlord for desirable repairs and improvements before he 
agreed to the tenancy. Both landlord and tenant are free men and both 
  
cure or deterrent . . . .”); see Joseph L. Sax & Fred J. Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 
MICH. L. REV. 869, 873 (1965) (“[T]raditional code enforcement provisions tend to be self-
defeating because they are largely built upon an erroneous economic premises.”); see also 
Salsich, supra note 34, at 44 (“Has housing code enforcement in the St. Louis area been 
successful? The answer would appear to be a resounding, No.”). 
 46. Kline v. Burns, 276 A.2d 248, 249-50 (N.H. 1971) (“The proper action for enforcing 
the ordinance rests with the City officials and once their attention was directed to the viola-
tions, it was their duty to act . . .  It has long been the general rule of law that, absent an 
agreement to repair, the tenant may not refuse to pay rent because the landlord’s failure to 
repair.”) 
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‘stand upon equal terms [and] either may equally well accept or refuse to 
enter into the relationship.’
47
 
The third approach—the one that provided justification for the implied 
warranty of habitability—viewed the codes as an obligation placed upon the 
landlord as a matter of public policy. This provided an opening for a radical 
(from a property perspective) new obligation upon landlords and a remedy 
for tenants. Some argued that the new obligation should be enforceable as a 
tort and courts should recognize a new tort of “slumlordism.”48 Others ar-
gued that courts should instead nest the tenant’s rights in the law of con-
tracts.49If the legislative branch adopted statutes requiring structures to meet 
minimum building standards, then it should follow that the tenants living in 
those buildings should have the benefit of those regulations. As Pines v. 
Perssion—an early case adopting the implied warranty of habitability—put 
it: 
Legislation and administrative rules, such as the safe place statute, build-
ing codes, and health regulations, all impose certain duties on a property 
owner with respect to the condition of his premises . . . . To follow the 
old rule of no implied warranty of habitability in leases, would in our 
opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative policy concerning 
housing standards. The need and social desirability of adequate housing 
for people in this era of rapid population increases is too important to be 
rebuffed by that obnoxious legal cliché, caveat emptor.50 
The legal debate was not the only factor playing into a reexamination 
of the landlord-tenant relationship. The “on the ground” reality of the dis-
parity between the landlord and tenant was becoming increasingly apparent. 
Landlords had a great deal of leverage in the rental process. Tenants were 
replaceable and landlords could present a property on a take it or leave it 
basis. There was no incentive to improve or maintain property because there 
was always a tenant desperate enough to take the property in a substandard 
condition, or “slum condition.”51 The inequities of humans living in slums 
  
 47. Simmons, supra note 28, at 576 (quoting Kirshenbaum v. Gen. Outdoor Adver. Co., 
180 N.E. 245, 247 (N.Y. 1932)). See also William Schwartz, Property and Conveyancing, 16 
ANN. SURV. MASS. L. 78, 79 (1968-69) (courts operated “under the flourishing myth that 
overborne tenants were omnicompetent people, dealing at arm’s length on a plane of legal 
parity, who might be expected to give the premises an intensive examination before renting 
them.”). 
 48. Sax & Hiestand, supra note 45, at 873. 
 49. Comment, The California Lease—Contract or Conveyance?, 4 STAN. L. REV. 244, 
244 (1952). 
 50. Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (Wis. 1961).   
 51. Joel R. Levine, The Warranty of Habitability, 2 CONN. L. REV. 61, 77–79 (1969) 
(arguing that in these conditions the lease agreement is a contract of adhesion). 
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triggered a social revolution of sorts to develop a policy to address the prob-
lem. By 1960, it was estimated that 10.6 million out of a total of 58.3 mil-
lion units of housing were substandard.52 The living conditions of the na-
tion’s poor were becoming too pronounced to be ignored.53 In 1966, Presi-
dent Johnson decried the fact that “some four million urban families [are] 
living in homes of such disrepair as to violate decent housing standards.”54  
The problem was acerbated as middle and upper classes moved to the sub-
urbs, draining local governments’ resources as the tax base moved out, put-
ting the plight of the inner city poor in stark relief.55 
Something had to give. As late as 1968, one scholar, while noting that 
courts had been willing to create a number of exceptions to the caveat emp-
tor rule, could find no jurisdiction that had imposed an implied obligation of 
habitability on landlords.56 In fact, he was willing to go so far as to say: “we 
must accept as gospel in the United States the basic principle of caveat les-
see . . .”57 If this author had written his article a couple of years later, the 
“gospel” of landlord-tenant relationships he found would be much different. 
Courts, conscious of the social and political movements afoot, were re-
ceptive to a reevaluation of the landlord-tenant relationship.  They needed a 
“ready word or phrase” to encapsulate the new relationship58 The phrase 
needed to be both manageable (so that other courts could quickly pick it up) 
and flow logically from prior legal concepts. The phrase “implied warranty 
of habitability” fit the bill; it was both easy to articulate and flowed logically 
  
 52. Tom L. Davis, Cooperative Self-Help Housing, 32 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 409, 409 
(1967). 
 53. Id. at 410 (“Enlightened leaders are aware that riots and violence against property 
are the harvest of generations of neglect and that the resources of a nation are dependent upon 
the productivity and cultural times of its people.”). 
 54. 112 CONG. REC. H1126 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1966) (message from Pres. Johnson).   
 55. Roberto G. Quercia & George C. Galster, Threshold Effects and the Expected Bene-
fits of Attracting Middle-Income Households to the Central City, 8 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 
409, 409–10 (1997); Super, supra note 1, at 402. 
 56. John S. Grimes, Caveat Lessee, 2 VAL. U. L. REV. 189, 199 (Spring 1968) (excep-
tions to the rule recognized in the case of “nuisance, furnished habitations, short term season-
al leases, constructive eviction, commercial frustration, lessors’ covenants, lettings for public 
use, knowledge of lessor of improper conditions or concealment amounting to fraud, areas in 
common use, lease of part of a building, multiple dwelling, fiduciary relationships, houses 
built by the lessor for rent, or special statutes”). 
 57. Id. at 206. See also Quinn & Phillips, supra note 16, at 225 (calling the continuing 
recognition of the property-based landlord-tenant relationship “just bad law” and stating that 
“it is incomprehensible that responsible mean and women who are normally alert to intolera-
ble social conditions in other societies can be so blind and complacent with respect to their 
own shameful system”). 
 58. Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 
B.C. L. REV. 503, 546 (1982) (quoting E. Levi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 8 
(1949)).  
2013] FORTY (PLUS) YEARS AFTER THE REVOLUTION 805 
from principles of contract law.59 As one of the leading cases in the area 
recognized, urban tenants in a high-rise apartment were not concerned about 
the land itself—as agrarian tenants were—but were instead seek-
ing/expecting/contracting for a “package of goods and services” including 
“not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, 
serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanita-
tion, and proper maintenance.”60 Courts were persuaded that creating a war-
ranty or promise that the residential leasehold would be in a habitable condi-
tion was consistent with the obligation of warranty in other areas of the law 
such as products liability. As the District of Columbia court held in a lead-
ing case adopting the implied warranty of habitability: 
Modern contract law has recognized that the buyer of goods and services 
in an industrialized society must rely upon the skill and honesty of the 
supplier to assure that goods and services purchased are of adequate 
quality. In interpreting most contracts, courts have sought to protect the 
legitimate expectations of the buyer and have steadily widened the sell-
er’s responsibility for the quality of goods and services through implied 
warranties of fitness and merchantability. Thus without any special 
agreement a merchant will be held to warrant that his goods are fit for 
the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used and that they are at 
least of reasonably average quality. Moreover, if the supplier has been 
notified that goods are required for a specific purpose, he will be held to 
warrant that any goods sold are fit for that purpose. These implied war-
ranties have become widely accepted and well established features of the 
common law, supported by the overwhelming body of case law. Today 
most states as well as the District of Columbia have codified and enacted 




Courts found it a short step from the obligations imposed in the con-
tract for goods to contracts for housing. In addition, there was a general be-
lief in the United States, underscored by President Johnson’s Great Society 
and war against poverty, that the time had come to take action against inad-
equate living conditions for the poor—bolstered by the belief that landlords 
  
 59. Id. at 521 (quoting E. Levi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 8 (1949)). 
Professor Glendon notes that the Minnesota Supreme Court had, as early as 1931, recognized 
an “implied covenant that the premises [in an apartment building] will be habitable,” but that 
concept did not gain traction until the introduction of the “implied warranty of habitability” 
and its asserted analogy to warranties implied in the sale of goods. Id. at 546–47 (quoting 
Delameter v. Foreman, 239 N.W. 148, 149 (Minn. 1931).  
 60. Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 61. Id. at 1075. 
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took in enough profits to justify shifting the cost of maintenance to them.62 
In the midst of this shift in public opinion, courts often acted first in this 
area because state legislative branches were typically unwilling to pass ex-
plicit legislation on the issue—either because of the conservative nature of 
the legislature and/or the strong influence of the landlord lobby (and the 
commensurate lack of influence by tenants).63 
Things began to change at the legislative level as reapportionment 
brought in more urban members, and tenants began to organize (using tech-
niques developed during the civil rights movement and aided by the increase 
of legal aid societies).64 In addition, middle and upper income renters started 
to experience the inequity of the traditional rules. As one commentator put 
it:  “[t]he resident of a Park Avenue flat who could not get his landlord to fix 
the garbage disposal . . . began to perceive himself as having a problem dif-
ferent in quality but not in kind from that of a black resident in Harlem 
whose flat was infested with rats.”65 In 1974, the American Law Institute 
proposed a draft Restatement of the Law, Second, Property, which proposed 
a non-waivable implied warranty of habitability.66 In an area of law where 
certainty and tradition tend to reign, this quick and sharp break from the past 
marked a new era in landlord-tenant law.   
With all of the attacks to common law doctrines, two realities persisted.   
First was the lingering concern expressed by some courts that the adoption 
of an implied warranty of habitability was a matter of policy best left to the 
legislature.67 Second was the need for a comprehensive and consistent ap-
proach to answer questions left open by adoption of the warranty when it 
was adopted by courts. For example, what were a tenant’s remedies upon 
  
 62. Rabin, supra note 32, at 551–52 (“The general prosperity made it seem feasible to 
launch and win a ‘war against poverty’ that would have been unthinkable in a period of eco-
nomic stringency. Judges and legislators believed that landlords could afford to give up some 
of their profits for the benefit of slum dwellers because the landlord’s economic position, like 
that of everyone else, was improving.”). 
 63. Donahue, supra note 40, at 245–46. 
 64. Id. at 246; Glendon, supra note 58, at 521 (In the late 1960s, “expanding legal ser-
vices bureaus began to attract lawyers who were interested not only in aiding individual poor 
clients, but in bringing about change in the legal and social systems.  Thus, ‘ordinary’ resi-
dential landlord-tenant cases often became test cases which could be financed, staffed and 
appealed [sic], even though the amounts actually in controversy might be quite small.”). 
 65. Donahue, supra note 40, at 246. 
 66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (Tent. Draft No. 2, 
1974). 
 67. Blackwell v. Del Bosco, 558 P.2d 563, 565 (Colo. 1976) (stating “[w]e have con-
cluded that, however desirable the adoption of the rule of implied warranty of habitability 
might be, the resolution of this issue is more properly the function of the General Assembly . 
. . [T]he implied warranty of habitability theory involves many economic and social complex-
ities, and we believe its adoption should be preceded by the research and study of which the 
legislature is more capable.”).  
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discovering a condition that breached the warranty of habitability? What 
type of conduct would violate the warranty? 
C. Defining the Terms of Engagement:  Introduction of the Uniform Resi-
dential Landlord Tenant Act and the Statutory Implied Warranty of Habita-
bility 
In 1972, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws produced the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act 
(“URLTA”), which provided state legislatures a model approach to recog-
nizing the warranty of habitability in residential leases. The stated purpose 
of the act was three-fold: (a) to “simplify, clarify, [and] modernize” the legal 
relationship between landlord and tenant;68 (b) to prompt landlords to “main-
tain and improve the quality of housing”69; and (c) to provide a uniform 
method of accomplishing these goals.70 Following early court decisions, the 
URLTA made provisions in the lease dependent and explicitly excused a 
tenant’s obligation to pay rent when the landlord materially breached the 
lease agreement.71 The act also provided some guidance for landlords as to 
exactly what their habitability obligations entailed.72 
The central duty of the landlord—which could lead to tenant remedies 
(for example rent withholding or the right to bring a claim for breach of the 
warranty)—was the obligation of the landlord to “maintain” the premises up 
to certain standards.73 The landlord has an obligation—explicitly imposed by 
the act—to comply with building and housing codes that “materially” affect 
health and safety.74 The landlord is also required to do “whatever is neces-
sary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition.”75 In addi-
tion, the landlord must maintain “all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, 
ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities and appliances, including 
elevators, supplied or required to be supplied.”76 The landlord must also 
provide and maintain “receptacles and conveniences for the removal of ash-
  
 68. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 1.102(b)(1), 7B U.L.A. 292 (2006). 
 69. Id. at § 1.102(b)(2). 
 70. Id. at § 1.102(b)(3). 
 71. Id.  
 72. R. Ladd Lonnquist & R. Michael Healey, A Prospectus on the Uniform Residential 
Landlord and Tenant Act in Nebraska, 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 336, 346 (1974-75)(“Under 
URLTA, the constricted common law review of a landlord’s obligations is rejected. Instead, 
the doctrine express in the recent warranty of habitability cases is adopted and codified. In 
addition, certain common concepts are revised and codified to clarify existing landlord obli-
gations.”). 
 73. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT §2.104, 7B U.L.A. 326 (2006). 
 74. Id. at § 2.104(a)(1). 
 75. Id. at § 2.104(a)(2). 
 76. Id. at § 2.104(a)(4). 
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es, garbage, rubbish, and other waste incidental to the occupancy of the 
dwelling . . .”77 Finally, the act requires that the landlord “supply running 
water and reasonable amounts of hot water at all times and reasonable heat . 
. . .”78 
If the landlord fails in her obligation to adequately maintain the prem-
ises, the tenant may cease paying rent and may assert a breach of the obliga-
tion to maintain in a subsequent action by the landlord to recover rent.79 The 
tenant also has the right to bring an affirmative claim against the landlord 
for failure of the duty to maintain the premises.80 
The concern that the URLTA went too far and swung the pendulum too 
much in the tenant’s favor was a common theme of skeptics of the act.  
First, some questioned whether there was really an abundance of uninhabit-
able rental units that required the act or whether the movement itself was 
based more on perception of housing conditions than reality.81 Others argued 
that making the URLTA apply to all residential leases as opposed to those 
that are most likely to suffer inhabitable conditions and against those land-
lords most likely to be able to afford the improvements would result in an 
unintended burden falling on small or individual landowners while corporate 
landlords would avoid liability.82 
Substantively, the URLTA, while purporting to emphasize the contrac-
tual nature of the landlord-tenant relationship, seemed to go further. For 
example, a tenant faced with an uninhabitable leasehold could choose to 
repair and then deduct the cost of repair from the rent. This could expose the 
landlord to “uncurbed exposure” not as a matter of contractual agreement 
but as a matter of legislative decree.83 The result of the act, opponents 
claimed, would be fewer landlords entering into the rental market resulting 
in even fewer rentals being available.84 In addition, it was argued that the 
  
 77. Id. at § 2.104(a)(5). 
 78. Id. at § 2.104(a)(6). 
 79. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 4.105, 7B U.L.A. 387 (2006). See 
also Samuel Jan Brakel, URLTA  in Operation: The Oregon Experience, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 565, 568 (1980). 
 80. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 4.104, 7B U.L.A. 383 (2006). 
 81. Rabin, supra note 32, at 542–43. But see Gerald R. Gibbons, Residential Landlord-
Tenant Law: A Survey of Modern Problems with Reference to the Proposed Model Code, 21 
HASTINGS L.J. 369, 385 (1970) (arguing that even though more rental units might theoretical-
ly be available, racial segregation makes the market for low income rentals tight and does not 
provide an incentive for landlords to improve or maintain the stock). 
 82. Donahue, supra note 40, at 260. 
 83. Strum, supra note 35, at 501. 
 84. Gibbons, supra note 81, at 385–86 (“The great need is to increase the supply and 
quality of low-cost rentals, and this requires investment in the construction of new units . . . .  
Increasing the rights of tenants tends to discourage private investment in new rental hous-
ing.”); Strum, supra note 35, at 501 (“This uncurbed exposure to liability may discourage the 
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landlord would shift the cost of the improvements to the tenants by increas-
ing rent, making housing unaffordable to those who need it most.85 Similar-
ly, there was a concern that improvements would give the landlord the in-
centive to take the units off the market rather than improve them.86 There 
was also concern that improving the units might make the units attractive to 
those who would not otherwise rent them, reducing the stock of rentals to 
low income.87 
So the revolution appears to be complete. The common law implied 
warranty and the statutory warranty have been around for forty years, with 
almost all states adopting the URLTA in some form. This leads to questions 
about how successful the implied warranty has been in balancing the land-
lord-tenant relationship, encouraging landlords to maintain and improve 
their rental properties, and (with regard to the URLTA) creating a uniform 
method of enforcement. This is a difficult (if not impossible) quest. It is 
impossible to know how many residential premises are being maintained in 
a habitable condition because of the implied warranty of habitability. These 
premises never make it into reported cases, but are an important category of 
houses that the adoption of the implied warranty affects. Conversely, it is 
impossible to measure through case law the number of tenants who are liv-
ing in inhabitable conditions with a valid claim for breach of the implied 
warranty of habitability but for one reason or another (lack of knowledge 
about the right, lack of alternative housing) fail to bring a claim at all. 
Therefore, this article’s examination of the implied warranty is necessarily 
limited to and skewed toward those cases resulting in a written opinion.88 
These limitations, while worth noting, are not fatal to an examination 
of the current status of the implied warranty of habitability. The cases exam-
ined here provide an insight into some of the issues that courts continue to 
face when dealing with the critical and unique landlord-tenant relationship. 
The first question is relatively straightforward: has the concept of “habitabil-
ity” changed since the implied warranty was first adopted more than forty 
years ago?   
  
building of rental units and spur the conversion of existing rental units to condominium or 
cooperative projects.”).  
 85. Rabin, supra note 32, at 558–59. 
 86. Donahue, supra note 40, at 261. 
 87. Rabin, supra note 32, at 560 (discussing Professor Bruce Ackerman’s arguments 
from Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing 
Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 Yale L.J. 1093 (1971) and 
Bruce Ackerman, More on Slum Housing and Redistribution Policy: A Reply to Professor 
Komesar, 82 Yale L.J. 1194 (1973)). 
 88. The article is also limited to purely contractual claims and does not include any 
substantive discussion of the rights of a tenant to bring a tort claim against a landlord based 
on the condition of the premises. 
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III. CONSIDERING “HABITABILITY” AS AN EVOLUTIONARY CONCEPT 
With the shift from the traditional property-based landlord-tenant rela-
tionship to the interpretation of the common law and statutory obligation 
(e.g. the URLTA) what has happened to the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity? When courts first began enacting the implied warranty, they did so 
based on certain cultural understandings of what was meant by “habitable” 
and what constituted a habitable premises. The judges’ frame of reference 
shaped how they interpreted the obligations of the landlord. These frames 
inevitably shift over time as new judges are faced with similar questions (is 
the premises habitable?) view the question of “habitability” through their 
own cultural lens. In short, the concept of habitability is largely socially 
constructed, and perhaps should evolve as judges with different social back-
grounds face these issues.89 
For purposes of this article, the fact that judges may view the concept 
of “habitability” differently based on the historical moment in which they 
live presents an empirical question. It has been more than forty years since 
the D.C. Circuit decided Javins v. First National Realty Corporation and the 
introduction of the URLTA. How has the concept of habitability fared? To 
provide a partial answer to the question, this article examines 117 cases 
dealing with the implied warranty of habitability in the residential lease con-
text between 2005 and 2012.90 
A.  In the Beginning:  Defining “Habitability” Under the New Implied 
Warranty 
The early courts had the unenviable task of drawing the line between a 
condition that made a residence uninhabitable and a condition which could 
be described as inconvenient, but not impacting habitability. This is a con-
  
 89. PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH 18–19 (1999) (“Institutional resources do not 
exist objectively in the world. They come into existence through social processes. Shifts in 
institutional and historical contexts also work to enable and constrain access to particular 
resources.”). See also Simon Swaffield, Contextual Meanings in Policy Discourse: A Case 
Study of Language Use Concerning Resource Policy in the New Zealand High Country, 31 
POL’Y SCI. 199, 205 (1998) (situational policy analysis “suggests that people from similar 
institutional backgrounds . . ., will tend to conceptualise resource policy issues in similar 
ways, and that meaning of specific terms may derive, in part, from the shared values of a 
wider group of people, for example a professional institution.”) (citing MARY DOUGLAS, HOW 
INSTITUTIONS THINK (1986))). 
 90. To obtain the universe of cases, I used the Westlaw database “all cases” and did a 
search for “implied warranty of habitability” and “landlord” with a date restriction of January 
1, 2000 through December 31, 2012.  As noted above, the limitation of this examination is 
significant.  It does not include any cases where the results were not included in a reported 
case.   
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tinuum. On one extreme, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a residence 
that did not include a bathroom, was not equipped with hot water and which 
violated local building codes, did not excuse the tenant from paying rent 
because she continued to live on the premises and—because the premises 
could physically be lived in—it was habitable.91 On the other extreme are 
conditions that do not trigger habitability concerns—often called amenities 
or conditions that may be inconvenient but not impacting habitability. In all 
jurisdictions where there is common law or statutory implied warranty, 
courts must make decisions about where along this continuum to place a 
particular complaint.92 
How strictly the definition of habitability will be defined remains an 
open question. In fact, in Washington state there is a split among intermedi-
ate appellate courts over the habitability standard, with one division requir-
ing a showing that the alleged breach of the warranty “render[ed] a dwelling 
actually unfit to be lived in”93 and another holding that a breach has been 
established when the defect “pose[s] an actual or potential safety hazard to 
its occupants.”94 Engaging in an “Erie-guess” a federal district court held 
that the Washington Supreme Court would likely adopt the more lenient 
standard of actual or potential hazard.95 
To put the question in contract terms: what conditions do the landlord 
and tenant contract for that would be considered a part of the “package of 
goods and services” that is implied into the lease?96 By comparing the an-
swer to this question when the implied warranty was first adopted and today, 
it can provide some evidence of whether the concept of “habitability” has 
changed over time. It seems reasonable to hypothesize that technological 
advances and societal expectations may have rendered certain items that 
were considered amenities when the implied warranty was first adopted 
necessities now.   
In 1974, Professor Moskovitz completed a study in which he undertook 
the task of evaluating the “new” doctrine of the implied warranty of habita-
  
 91. Morris v. Jones, 198 S.E.2d 354 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973). Certainly this case would 
come out differently today.  To define the warranty of habitability so strictly defeats the 
purpose of the warranty and forces tenants to vacate the premises, essentially returning the 
law to the days of constructive eviction. 
 92. See UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 2.104(a)(1) (landlord shall 
comply with building and housing codes that “materially affect[] health and safety”); id. at § 
2.104(a)(2) (landlord shall make repairs and do what is necessary to keep premises in “fit and 
habitable condition”); id. at § 2.104(a)(3) (landlord shall keep common areas in “clean and 
safe condition”). 
 93. Wright v. Miller, 963 P.2d 934, 940 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (“The alleged defects 
here do not impact the livability of the house so as to render it unfit for habitation.”). 
 94. Lian v. Stalick, 25 P.3d 467, 472 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
 95. Pinckney v. Smith, 484 F.Supp.2d 1177, 1182–84 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 
 96. Javins, supra note 60, at 1074.  
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bility and examining the issues it raised, providing a glimpse into some early 
cases applying the warranty.97 As part of his study, Professor Moskovitz 
sought to identify and categorize what conditions breached the implied war-
ranty in cases decided from the initial adoption of the warranty through the 
publication of his article in 1974. His analysis provides a perspective of how 
the implied warranty was viewed by courts in the early years of its adoption. 
Moskovitz found that early courts were focused on facilities. This in-
cluded facilities on the rental premises as well as common areas that impact 
the leased premises, but are in the control of the landlord (e.g. central heat 
and water pipes).98 There was a line below which the condition would not be 
considered a breach.99 Thus, the seriousness of the defect was important; 
mere de minimus violations of the building code were not considered a 
breach. The test was whether the tenant was “deprived of essential functions 
which a residence is expected to provide.”100 Moskovitz discovered that 
courts had found that defects in eating, sleeping, or restroom facilities were 
most likely to violate the warranty. In addition, the fear that the tenant 
would suffer injury or health problems as a result of the condition constitut-
ed a breach.101 
In essence, early courts limited the meaning of “habitability” to condi-
tions that directly related to whether the residence could be lived in and em-
phasized certain facilities necessary to satisfy the livability standard. This 
limited approach is unsurprising considering that courts were deciding these 
cases from the prior position that there was no responsibility to provide a 
habitable residence. Would judges today—removed from shock of the out-
break of the revolutionary—hold to the same categories of these older courts 
or would they work to expand the definition to fit new cultural expectations?   
 
  
 97. Myron Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine Raising 
New Issues, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1444 (1974).   
 98. Id. at 1455. 
 99. The idea that any violation of housing code ordinances could render a lease invalid 
had credence in early cases as courts sought to establish what should be considered a breach 
of the implied warranty.  For example, in Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. 
Cir. 1968), the court found that the underlying lease was void because it contained violations 
of the D.C. housing codes, including “obstructed commode, a broken railing and insufficient 
ceiling height in the basement . . . .” The court reasoned that to uphold the lease would 
“flout” the purposes of the housing codes. Id. at 837. 
 100. Moskovitz, supra note 97, at 1459.   
 101. Id. at 1461.   
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B.  Defining Habitability Today:  An Examination of Cases from 2005–
2012 
The simple conclusion after reviewing reported cases between 2005 
and 2012 is that there are very few conditions that courts have found to con-
stitute an uninhabitable condition that would not also breaches of the obliga-
tion of habitability under earlier cases. The recent cases can be placed into 
four overarching categories: (1) “slum” conditions;102 (2) substandard struc-
tural conditions;103 (3) substandard physical conditions on the premises;104 
and (4) no breach of the implied warranty.105   
1. “Slumlord” Conditions 
The cases that are perhaps most similar to those that led to the adoption 
of the implied warranty of habitability, are those that allege slumlord condi-
tions.  These properties have numerous substandard conditions. The condi-
tions include both structural and physical conditions of the property.106 Typ-
ically the facts of these cases are also particularly egregious. For example, in 
the seminal case of Pines v. Perssion, the premises were in such disrepair 
that the landlord did not tell prospective tenants that he had previously re-
sided on premises because he was embarrassed to admit that he had lived in 
such conditions.107 In Hilder v. St. Peter, another often-cited case, the tenant 
faced among other things broken windows, inoperable toilets, inadequate 
electrical wiring, and an overwhelming odor of raw sewage.108 
More recently, slumlord condition cases continue to be surprisingly 
common. Since 2005, there were fourteen cases dealing with properties with 
slum conditions, 29% of the total cases where a breach of the implied war-
ranty was found. Furthermore, the facts are no less egregious than some of 
the early cases. In a 2008 case from the District of Columbia, a housing in-
spection report found: “electrical deficiencies, ineffective heating, rotting 
structures, basement flooding, and rodent infestation.”109 In a California case 
the court found a gas leak (resulting in period without heat and hot water), 
no stove, the floor in bathroom was caving in, the toilet leaked a foul-
  
 102. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 103. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 104. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 105. See infra Part III.B.4. 
 106. See In re Stancil, 2005 WL 3036647 (Bankr. D.C. 2005) (numerous tenants with 
numerous complaints). 
 107. Pines, 111 N.W.2d at 410. 
 108. Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 206 (Vt. 1984). 
 109. Chibs v. Fisher, 960 A.2d 588, 589 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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smelling liquid, there were problems with electricity, and gaps between the 
floor and wall that allowed rats and spiders into the apartment.110 
2. Structural Conditions of the Premises 
The second category is defective or non-conforming structural condi-
tions. This category includes cases where the only claim of breach is a de-
fect in the physical structure of the leasehold itself. These types of condi-
tions are the most likely to compromise the value of the landlord’s invest-
ment if not remedied. Therefore, it is not surprising that during the time 
frame studied, there were only ten cases (approximately 20%) where a struc-
tural defect alone was cited as a breach of the implied warranty. For exam-
ple, a court held that inadequate wiring and failure to have adequate fire 
blocking (in violation of fire code) was a violation.111 Structural conditions 
on the premises that are faulty often lead to additional harm to the tenant. 
For example, where the landlord neglected a building’s roof and brick fa-
çade—a breach of the implied warranty of habitability—it allowed rainwater 
into the premises and damaged the tenant’s personal property.112 In another 
case the tenant noticed “bubbles” on the ceiling in her bedroom (presumably 
from a water leak) and the ceiling subsequently collapsed causing injury.113 
3. Physical Condition on the Premises 
The third category of cases involves a breach of the implied warranty 
of habitability based on the physical condition of the property. This includes 
both the lack of essential services as well as unbearable condition—most 
commonly odors. In these cases there are no allegations that the premises 
are structurally unsound, but that a condition on the premises breaches the 
warranty. Recent cases that have found a breach based on the physical con-
dition of the premises have involved bedbugs114 roach or rodent infesta-
  
 110. Pama Management Co. v. Brooks, No. ACIAS 1100051, 2012 WL 6213789 (Cal. 
App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2012). 
 111. Chiodini v. Fox, 207 S.W.3d 174, 175–78 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). 
 112. Spanish Court Two Condo. Ass’n v. Carlson, 979 N.E.2d 891, 894 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2012). 
 113. Dumbadze v. Saxon Hall Owner, LLC, 940 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d 
Dept. 2012). 
 114. Lee v. Fairfield Prop., LP, No. 2:12-cv-06202-ODW(SHx), 2012 WL 5411818 (C.D. 
Cal. 2012); see JWD & Sons, Ltd. v. Alexander, 941 N.Y.S.2d 538 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 2011); see 
also Kolb v. DeVille I Prop., LLC, 326 S.W.3d 896 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010); see also Valoma v. 
G-Way Mgmt., LLC, 918 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2010). 
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tion,115
 
and mold.116 However, even in these cases, the condition must be 
more than a typical or reasonable tenant could be expected to bear. For ex-
ample, a tenant’s claim was dismissed where her evidence did not establish 
the presence of mold beyond what typically exists in residential units.117 
Inadequate provision of essential services is also a breach of the war-
ranty. A breach will most likely be found where the landlord completely 
fails to provide an essential service such as water,118 heat,119 or electricity.120 
In one extreme example, the landlord breached her duty when she had the 
water turned off to the premises and then called child services and reported 
that the tenant’s child was living in home without running water.121 
A breach can also occur when the service, while provided, is essential-
ly unusable by the tenant.122 For example, a breach was found at a property 
where tap water had a noxious odor that was “so extreme that it made [the 
tenant and her children] nauseous, ruined clothes washed in it, and forced 
them not only to launder clothes, but to bathe and eat, elsewhere.”123 A land-
lord also breaches the warranty when she provides a service but it is not up 
  
 115. Landis & Landis Constr., LLC v. Nation, 286 P.3d 979 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012); 
Hammie v. Reddick, 2012 WL 5200910, *1, *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2012) (“Rodent infestation 
is certainly a grounds to conclude a premises was uninhabitable.”). 
 116. McCall v. Norman, No. COA12-244, 2012 WL 3573897, at *1, *3 (N.C. Ct. App. 
Aug. 21, 2012); Poland v. Sandville, No. DC-26028-09, 2012 WL 3030236 at *1, *2 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. July 26, 2012) (apartment flood resulting in mold); N. Vill. at Webster 
v. Braman, No. 11-P-391, 2012 WL 761966, at *1, *1–2 (Mass. App. Ct. March 12, 2012); 
Sanders ex rel Sanders v. Rosenberg, No. 06-1406(NLH), 2008 WL 2945983 *1, *1  (D.N.J. 
July 30, 2008). But see Allen v. Cypress Vill., Ltd., No. 3:10-CV-994-WKW, 2011 WL 
2559614 *1, *2–4 (M.D. Ala. June 27, 2011) (recognizing that Alabama does not recognize 
claim for breach of implied warranty of habitability and dismissing claim based on presence 
of mold); Huber Rental Prop., LLC v. Allen, 2012 Ark. App. 642 at 1, No. CA 12-255, 2012 
WL 5423919, at *7 (Ark. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2012) (while Arkansas does not recognize an 
implied warranty of habitability, tenant had a valid claim for breach of express provisions of 
lease agreement). 
 117. Avalon Oaks v. King, No. 07-ADMS-10042, 2007 WL 4100265 at *1 (Mass. Dist. 
App. Div. Aug. 23, 2007). 
 118. Belanger v. Mulholland, 30 A.23d 836, 837 (Me. 2011) (water pipe broke and land-
lord told tenant that the tenant “was on his own with that” and that he would only allow an 
abatement of rent for repairs). 
 119. Amerifirst Mortg. Corp. v. Green, No. SP 821/05, 2005 WL 1306065 at *2, 801 
N.Y.S.2d 229 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. May 31, 2005). 
 120. Holsman v. Carrick, 2010 WL 1189596 at *9(Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (“There was sub-
stantial evidence from which the court could have concluded that the premises were uninhab-
itable for an appreciable period of time, due to water intrusion, electrical power, and heating 
concerns . . . .”). 
 121. Crenshaw v. Roland, 965 N.E.2d 341 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011). 
 122. Durkee v. McMahon, No. 2006-465, 2007 WL 5313341, at *1 (Vt. Apr. 1, 2007) 
(failure to provide potable water). 
 123. Newkirk v. Scala, 90 A.D.3d 1257, 1258 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). 
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to code. For example, where heat was furnished, but not within the tempera-
ture required by the state’s health code.124 
Property that is made unbearable as a result of odor can also breach the 
implied warranty.125 Often these cases are accompanied by other structural 
problems (such as faulty plumbing), but this is not always the case. For ex-
ample, the warranty was breached where a septic system malfunctioned and 
overflowed in a common area creating a “horrible septic smell” in the 
house.126 A New Jersey court found a breach of the implied warranty where 
a tenant’s upstairs neighbor created strong fumes “like plastic burning or 
smoking crack cocaine.”127 
As noted above, there are few areas where there is clear evolution of 
the implied warranty of habitability. There are few conditions where it can 
be said with a fair amount of certainty that the condition would not have 
been considered a breach when the implied warranty of habitability was first 
adopted. However, there does seem to be some movement with regard to 
conditions outside the tenant’s unit that impact the tenant’s use and enjoy-
ment of the home.128 Some courts have been willing to recognize a breach in 
conditions that historically would have likely been considered merely an 
inconvenience or not to be included in the definition of “habitable.” A prime 
example of this is second-hand smoke. A couple of recent New York cases 
hold that infiltration of an apartment by second-hand smoke breaches the 
implied warranty of habitability.129 A Massachusetts case also found a pos-
sible breach of the implied warranty (the case was remanded) where the 
tenant fell on an icy sidewalk in front of her apartment. The court held that 
the sidewalk directly outside the apartment is a “physical facility vital to the 
use of” the tenant’s apartment.130 
  
 124. Claessens v. Aiello, 935 N.E.2d 391, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010); Sherr v. Ndir, 873 
N.Y.S.2d 515, at *1 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 2008) (lack of proper heat during the night “on more than 
several occasions”). 
 125. See Newkirk, 90 A.D.3d at 1258. 
 126. Pocasset Mobile Home Park, LLC v. Carvalho, 2011 Mass. App. Div. 77, at *2 
(Mass. App. Div. 2011). 
 127. Penny Point Park Apartments v. Barnes, No. LT-5234-06, 2007 WL 3289133, at *1 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 8, 2007). 
 128. Armstrong v. Archives, L.L.C., 46 A.D.3d 465, 465 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (remand-
ing for a determination of whether the noise coming from outside tenant’s apartment was “so 
excessive that [the tenant was] deprived of the essential functions that a residence is supposed 
to provide.”) (citation omitted). 
 129. Upper East Lease Assocs., LLC v. Cannon, 924 N.Y.S.2d 312 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2011); 
Poyck v. Bryant, 820 N.Y.S.2d 774 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2006). 
 130. Cortes v. Clinton Hous. Auth., 27 Mass.L.Rptr. 465, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2010) 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Doe v. New Bedford Hous. Auth., 630 N.E.2d 248, 253–54 
(Mass. 1994)). 
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4. Conditions that Do Not Breach the Warranty of Habitability 
Certainly, not every less-than-perfect condition on leased premises 
gives rise to a valid claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability. 
Conditions that are considered amenities or merely impact the aesthetics of 
the premises will not constitute a breach.131 Attempting to reconcile these 
cases is problematic because, just as every leasehold is unique, every claim 
for breach of the implied warranty is distinct. Generalities in this regard can 
be difficult at best and deceptive at worst. It is not just the nature of the con-
dition itself that determines whether there is a breach; it is also its severity. 
In other words, while a recurring or constant problem with mold will likely 
trigger a breach of the warranty, a singular occurrence that is quickly reme-
died by the landlord may not.132 However, there are cases that demonstrate 
the types of claims that are considered to be beyond the outer perimeter of 
the warranty. For example, Professor Moskovitz found that early courts 
were unwilling to find a breach of the implied warranty as a result of leaky 
water faucets, cracks in walls, unpainted walls, and defective venetian 
blinds.133 
More recent cases have a similar theme when finding a tenant’s claim 
did not rise to the level of a breach of the implied warranty.134 As noted pre-
viously, the majority of the time tenants are not successful arguing for 
breach when the condition complained of occurs outside the leased premises 
or is a defect not associated with the leased premises.135 The Vermont Su-
preme Court, a leading court in adopting the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity, was recently faced with the question of whether a landlord breached the 
warranty when a tenant’s car was damaged after snow and ice fell from the 
  
 131. Hammie v. Reddick, No. NNHCV116022445S, 2012 WL 5200910, at *9 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 1, 2012) (stating that the “passage to the backdoor, although rendered some-
what inconvenient and not presenting an aesthetically pleasing sight” did not breach code 
obligation to provide safe means of ingress and egress). 
 132. AvalonBay Cmtys., Inc. v. Hamilton, 26 Mass.L.Rptr. 436, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
2010). 
 133. Moskovitz, supra note 97, at 1455–63.    
 134. The tenant has the burden to bring forth evidence sufficient to demonstrate a breach 
of the implied warranty.  Mere allegations—even if sufficient if proven—are not enough. 
Adams v. Apeland, No. 382230-0-II, 2009 WL 4047868, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2009)((“[T]he [tenants] did not provide any evidence sufficient to support their claim that the 
lake water was contaminated.  There is no evidence supporting the allegation that the water 
system at the property”) inter alia impaired the tenants’ “health or safety”) (quoting WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060 (West 2013); Baldwin Merrick Assocs. v. Relles, 867 N.Y.S.2d 
372 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2008) (tenant testimony alone was not sufficient to establish breach for 
roach infestation). 
 135. See Pocasset Mobile Home Park, LLC v. Carvalho, 2011 Mass. App. Div. 77, at *2 
(Mass. App. Div. 2011); Penny Point Park Apartments v. Barnes, No. LT-5234-06, 2007 WL 
3289133, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 8, 2007). 
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residence onto her parked car.136 Stating that the warranty of habitability has 
“been limited to circumstances of . . . failures to meet personal safety and 
health standards for tenant occupation of the premises,” the court held that 
the tenant’s claim did not involve a “compromise to tenant’s personal health 
and safety . . . unrelated to the landlord’s implied or statutory guarantee of 
premises ‘safe, clean and fit for human habitation.’”137 The Michigan Su-
preme Court ruled in a similar fashion with regard to a tenant who fractured 
her ankle walking on 1-2 inches of accumulated snow in the parking lot of 
her apartment complex.138 The court held that the parking lot was not part of 
the “premises” for purposes of the warranty of habitability.139 Similarly, 
courts have been hesitant to find a breach when the claimed violation is the 
result of actions by third-parties. For example, where the tenant alleged that 
harassment by other tenants was a breach of the implied warranty, the court 
held that the allegations did not rise to the level of the type of mandated 
obligations under the warranty—such as “hot or cold water, heat, light . . . 
.”140 Similarly, the New Hampshire Supreme Court denied a tenant’s claim 
for breach of warranty based on criminal assault by the tenant’s neighbor:  
“the warranty of habitability implied in residential lease agreements protects 
tenants against structural defect, but does not require landlord so take af-
firmative measures to provide security against criminal attack.”141 
At times a finding that the tenant has not established a breach can seem 
arbitrary and based on how the court frames the alleged defect.  For exam-
ple, in a New Jersey case tenants faced water infiltration into the basement 
of their premises requiring them to move their personal property out of the 
way.142 The landlord repaired the problem in a timely manner, but the ten-
ants sought breach of the implied warranty based on the “massive amounts 
of inconvenience” they suffered in having to move their property and in 
having to wear galoshes to go into the basement to do their laundry.143 The 
court found that such “inconvenience … does not equate to the loss of a 
  
 136. Weiler v. Hooshiari, 19 A.3d 124 (Vt. 2011). 
 137. Weiler, 19 A.3d at 127. (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 4457(a) (2013)). The cases 
which the court cites to give examples of the type of condition that breaches the warranty 
includes unsafe drinking water, broken toilet, broken septic and heat systems and leaky roof, 
and deteriorating walls, soiled carpet, disconnected heat and electricity, and inadequate 
plumbing.  Id.  
 138. Allison v. AEW Capital Mgmt. LLC, 751 N.W. 2d 8 (Mich. 2008). 
 139. Id. at 14–15. 
 140. Freda v. Phillips, No. C–63–12 SC, 2012 WL 3569954, at *1 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 2012). 
The court also noted that the tenant seemed to be the instigator of much of the conflict with 
the other tenants. Id. 
 141. Ward v. Inishmaan Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 931 A.2d 1235,1238 (N.H. 2007) (quoting 
Walls v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., Inc., 633 A.2d 103 (N.H. 1993) (internal quotes omitted). 
 142. Cohn v. Hinger, 2011 WL 6820293 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2011). 
 143. Id. at *2. 
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‘vital facility’ of the rental property, nor did it render the apartment unliva-
ble during the limited period the seepage was occurring.”144 This was true 
even though the tenants were unable to utilize the basement space while the 
water was present.145 
It is difficult to explain why the concept of “habitability” has changed 
significantly within the past 40 years. Perhaps the simplest answer is that 
what is considered as essential facilities for a habitable residence has not 
evolved, even as technology has advanced. Courts may view statutes such as 
the URLTA—which focus on basic housing and building codes—as setting 
the outer limits of habitability, creating a hesitation to expand the concept 
beyond these statutory minimums. There are also some external social rea-
sons why there has not been movement. First, societal priorities have 
changed. While at the time of the Great Society there was a belief that legis-
lation and government intervention could eliminate substandard housing, 
this idea of societal responsibility has been replaced by skepticism for the 
effectiveness of government involvement. Secondly, the recent economic 
downturn has hit low-income individuals particularly hard. Not only have 
the types of problems normally associated with economic hard times in-
creased—such as unemployment, foreclosures, and domestic issues146—but 
the downturn also pushed a number of new individuals into poverty.  
While the number and needs of the poor have increased, funding for 
traditional methods of access to lawyers for the poor has been slashed.147 
This has resulted in record numbers of self-represented litigants who cannot 
hire a lawyer.148 In fact, for the cases examined for this article, there were 
twice as many litigants proceeding pro se as were represented by legal aid 
  
 144. Cohn, 2011 WL 6820293 at *7 (quoting Chess v. Muhammad, 430 A.2d 928, 929 
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1981)). 
 145. Id. 
 146. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE 
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 5 (Sept. 2009), available 
athttp://www.lsc.gov/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf. (“The cur-
rent economic crisis, with its attendant problems of high unemployment, home foreclosures 
and family stress, has resulted in legal problems relating to consumer credit, housing, em-
ployment, bankruptcies, domestic violence and child support, and has pushed many families 
into poverty for the first time.”).  
 147. Funding Cuts Expected to Result in Nearly 750 Fewer Staff Positions at LSC-
Funded Programs (Aug 15, 2012), http://www.lsc.gov/media/press-releases/funding-cuts-
expected-result-nearly-750-fewer-staff-positions-lsc-funded. 
 148. Karen McGlone, Framing the Fight for Justice, 72 OR. STATE BAR BULL. 25, 30 
(2012) (“Funding for legal aid has been slashed which, when combined with issues that 
mushroom in a poor economy—debt collection, foreclosures and marriage dissolution—
drives more and more people to represent themselves. The responsibility for educating them 
about court proceedings, legal issues, and how to represent themselves increasingly falls to 
the underfunded courts.”). 
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lawyers.149 Rare is the pro se litigant who is familiar enough with landlord-
tenant law to be able to push for an expansion of the implied warranty. Fur-
thermore, the dramatic reduction in funding to legal aid offices also decreas-
es the likelihood of an expansion. This is a particularly unfortunate situation 
because legal aid lawyers were at the forefront of pressing for initial recog-
nition of the implied warranty of habitability.150 Now these lawyers, faced 
with more clients and decreased funding, do not have the time, resources, or 
institutional support to press cases for larger policy goals, such as pressing 
for the expansion of tenants’ rights. In sum, there is very little evidence that 
what constitutes “habitability” has shifted over the last forty years. It has 
remained limited to structural and physical conditions of the premises. The 
fact that there has been very little variability in the conditions that establish 
a breach of the warranty of habitability leaves open the question of whether 
there has been any shift in the nature or understanding of the claims asserted 
that claim a breach of the duty to maintain a habitable premises. 
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD TENANT ACT 
ON THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY 
Current issues surrounding the implied warranty of habitability extend 
beyond the scope of a landlord’s habitability obligation. There is also an 
overarching question about how the common law implied warranty and the 
statutory-created implied warranty (e.g. the URLTA) interact. In jurisdic-
tions where the implied warranty was adopted as a matter of common law 
prior to legislative action, does a common law claim continue to be viable, 
or has it been superseded by the legislative enactment? In jurisdictions 
where the legislature acted first, does a common law claim of breach exist at 
all? 
  
 149. Fourteen litigants acted pro se and seven litigants were represented by a legal aid 
office. A note of caution: these numbers only represent those individuals that I could conclu-
sively determine were represented by a legal aid lawyer or were proceeding pro se. There-
fore, these numbers could underestimate the problem. For example, it is possible that some-
one acted pro se at the trial court level and obtained a lawyer for appeal. Those litigants 
would not be counted as acting pro se. 
 150. Helaine M. Barnett, Justice for All: Are We Fulfilling the Pledge?, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 
403, 416 (2005) (“Litigation brought by legal aid lawyers during the OEO and early LSC 
periods created important new legal rights . . . The work of legal services lawyers also led to 
the prohibition of retaliatory evictions and the recognition of an implied warranty of habita-
bility in many states.”); Alan W. Houseman, Civil Legal Assistance for Low-Income Persons: 
Looking Back and Looking Forward, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1213, 1223 (2002). 
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A. Arguments for Maintaining a Separate and Unique Common Law Im-
plied Warranty of Habitability 
Landlords typically take the position that a statutory implied warranty 
supersedes any common law rights. Consider the Washington case of Landis 
& Landis Construction v. Nation.151 In that case, Landis & Landis Construc-
tion (Landis) leased a house from Nation for its crew. The day that the crew 
arrived, they discovered a rat infestation (an express violation of the Wash-
ington landlord-tenant act) in the house. The crew immediately moved out, 
refusing to risk exposure.152 Landis sued Nation for the return of prepaid 
rent.153 Nation argued that Landis should lose because she had not been giv-
en a sufficient opportunity to cure the infestation as required by the state’s 
landlord-tenant act.154 Specifically, the statute required that the landlord be 
given notice of the condition and at least ten days to cure the defect—and 
even more time than ten days if the condition is “so substantial that it is un-
feasible for the landlord to remedy the defect within the time allotted.”155 
The question for the court was whether the statute superseded the 
common law implied warranty of habitability. If it did, then Landis was not 
entitled to a return of the prepaid rent because it had not satisfied the notice 
requirements under the statute. However, if the common law implied war-
ranty of habitability remained a valid claim, Landis’s claim could stand be-
cause the common law had no requirement that the landlord be given a set 
amount of time to remedy the condition. 
The Washington appellate court held that the landlord-tenant act did 
not supersede the common law remedy.156 It relied on language from the 
Washington statute which provided tenants an option to pursue statutory 
rights “in addition to [the] pursuit of remedies otherwise provided him or 
her by law.”157 The court read this language to mean that the tenant had a 
choice of three remedies when the landlord failed to maintain the premises: 
they could proceed under the lease, under the landlord-tenant act, or under 
the common law.158 It should be noted that the court’s interpretation was 
made somewhat easier because the Washington Supreme Court adopted the 
common law implied warranty after the legislature adopted the landlord-
  
 151. Landis & Landis Constr., LLC v. Nation, 286 P.3d 979 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).  
 152. Id. at 980–81. 
 153. Id. at 981   
 154. Id. at 982.   
 155. Id. at 981. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Landis, 286 P.3d at 981. 
 158. Id. 
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tenant act.159 This fact reinforced the position that the landlord-tenant act 
could not have superseded a common law implied warranty that did not 
come into existence until after the statute went into effect.160 
The same issue arose under very similar facts in the Kansas case Claus 
v. Deware Enterprises, LLC.161 In Claus, the tenant, moving to Kansas from 
out of state, provided a security deposit to the landlord ($475).162 Upon ar-
riving at the rental, the tenant discovered the premises uninhabitable—
inoperable door locks, defective electrical fixtures, and a cockroach infesta-
tion.163 The tenant sued for return of his security deposit.164 The landlord 
argued that the tenant forfeited the deposit by failing to give the landlord an 
opportunity to remedy the conditions as required by Kansas’ landlord-tenant 
act.165 The landlord argued that the act superseded any common law right 
that the tenant had and failure to follow the notice requirements was fatal to 
the tenant’s claim. The Kansas court took an interesting position in resolv-
ing how the common law and statute interact.166 Unlike Washington, the 
Kansas Supreme Court adopted a common law implied warranty prior to 
adoption of the statute. The court held that the landlord-tenant act “did not 
abrogate the holding in Steele v. Latimer [recognizing the implied warranty 
of habitability], but rather the [act] included or is augmented by the land-
lord’s common law duty to provide a habitable premises.”167 This, according 
to the court, meant that the tenant’s claim could not be separated into 
“breach of implied warranty of habitability” and “breach of residential land-
lord tenant act”—instead, the claim was simply for breach of contract.168 
  
 159. The Residential Landlord Tenant Act went into effect in July 1973 and the Washing-
ton Supreme Court adopted the implied warranty of habitability in Foisy v. Wyman, 515 P.2d 
160 (Wash. 1973) in October, 1973. Landis, 286 P.3d at 981. 
 160. Id. at 982 (“Because the act and the Foisy decision developed independently, ‘we 
cannot presume that the Legislature intended the act to restrict application of the implied 
warranty of habitability.’”) (quoting Aspon v. Loomis, 816 P.2d 751, 815 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1991)).  The court notes that there was some confusing language from cases indicating that 
the legislature followed the “lead” of the Washington Supreme Court in adopting the Resi-
dential Landlord Tenant Act, but points out that the statement was incorrect from a chrono-
logical standpoint. Id. (“The legislature may have been following a general trend in the law, 
but obviously the legislature was not following the lead of Foisy, which had not yet been 
decided.”) 
 161. Claus v. Deware Enters., L.L.C., 136 P.3d 964 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006). 
 162. Id. at *1. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at *2. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at *3. 
 167. Claus, 136 P.3d 964. 
 168. Id. (“The district court was not required to separately analyze the implied warranty 
of habitability and the provisions of the RLTA.  Rather, both were germane to the minimum 
housing standards which are necessarily read into the lease agreement as a contractual obliga-
tion of [the landlord].”). 
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Therefore when evaluating a claim, the landlord-tenant act “augmented by” 
the common law determines the obligations of the landlord and whether a 
breach has occurred. Thus, it was no defense to a breach of contract claim 
based upon the implied warranty of habitability that the tenant failed to give 
the notice and time to cure required by the statute—because the common 
law aspect of the warranty did not require any particular notice.169 
As these cases indicate, a holding that the implied warranty and the res-
idential landlord-tenant law provide separate claims (Landis)170 or that 
common law rights supplement the statutory remedy (Claus)171 typically 
works to the tenant’s benefit – allowing her to bring a claim based on the 
common law implied warranty of habitability even when her statutory claim 
fails.   
Another recent case finding a common law claim independent of the 
statutory scheme, but providing a note of caution, is Myrah v. Campbell 
from Utah.172 In Campbell the court dismissed the tenant’s statutory claim 
because, although she sent emails and telephoned the landlord about the 
problems with her rental, she did not provide formal written notice of a de-
fect and an opportunity to cure as required by the statute.173 The court, how-
ever, recognizing a separate claim for breach of the common law warranty, 
allowed her common law claim to stand.174 Note that the consequence of 
recognizing a distinct common law and statutory claim means that that fail-
ure to satisfy the statutory requirements may result in denial of damages that 
might be available as a matter of statute but not as a matter of common law. 
Therefore, in Campbell, the tenant was not entitled to statutory penalties for 
failure to return her security deposit because she failed to satisfy the statuto-
ry prerequisites. Thus, even in those jurisdictions where a common law im-
plied warranty of habitability exists, the tenant may find herself forfeiting 
certain rights by relying solely on the common law implied warranty. 
  
 169. Id. (“We do not read the RLTA as granting every landlord 30 days accrued rent upon 
entering a lease agreement.”). See also Pocasset Mobile Home Park, LLC v. Carvalho, No. 
10-ADMS-40024, 2011 WL 1744114, *1 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (requiring that tenant per-
sonally give notice to landlord in order to trigger landlord’s obligation to remedy defective 
sewer system “interprets the notice requirement too strictly, particularly for a large multi-unit 
facility.”). 
 170. Landis, 286 P.3d 979. 
 171. Claus, 136 P.3d 964. 
 172. Myrah v. Campbell, 163 P.3d 679, 683 (Utah Ct. App. 2007).    
 173. Id. The court noted that the tenant failed to properly appeal the issue of whether 
substantial compliance under the statute would be sufficient notice and that the argument was 
therefore waived.  
 174. Id. at 684 (“Because all Tenants’ counterclaims concerning habitability under the 
Act were dismissed by partial summary judgment, we assume that the trial court analyzed the 
habitability issue under the common law implied warranty of habitability.”). 
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B. Arguments for Preemption of the Common Law Implied Warranty and 
for Rejecting Adoption of the Implied Warranty 
While recognition of a separate common law cause of action may work 
to the benefit of the tenant, the opposite is also true—a finding that the statu-
tory warranty preempts or supersedes the common law claim will work to 
the advantage of the landlord. The Vermont case of Willard v. Parsons Hill 
Partnership provides a stark example.175 Although the Willard court ulti-
mately held that the common law warranty continues to exist independent of 
the statutory claim, a vigorous dissent argued for preemption.  
In Willard, the landlord was aware that the tenants’ drinking water had 
been deemed unsafe and undrinkable by the state department of health for 
fourteen years.176 Despite this knowledge, the landlord failed to take any 
action and did not inform the tenants. Subsequently, while doing Internet 
research, a tenant serendipitously discovered the unsafe nature of the wa-
ter.177 One group of tenants retained a lawyer who provided notice to the 
landlord of the unsafe drinking water. A second group of tenants did not 
give notice. Both groups of tenants brought suit against the landlord inter 
alia for breach of the implied warranty of habitability.178 
The landlord sought to have the warranty claim dismissed, arguing that 
the tenants’ only remedy was under Vermont’s landlord-tenant act.179 The 
trial court agreed, holding that the act codified and superseded the common 
law implied warranty of habitability and the tenants were required to follow 
the procedures set out in the act to recover.180 Furthermore, because the act 
required notice to the landlord and an opportunity to cure, all of the tenants’ 
claims were dismissed.181 The claims of the tenants who gave notice were 
dismissed because they did not give the landlord a sufficient opportunity to 
cure the defect—the trial court strictly construing the statutory language 
measured the time for cure from the time that the tenants gave actual no-
tice—and the claims of the tenants who did not give notice were dismissed 
because of the failure to give any notice.182 The court refused to recognize 
  
 175. Willard v. Parsons Hill P’ship, 882 A.2d 1213 (Vt. 2005). 
 176. Id. at 1215. 
 177. Id. at 1214. 
 178. Id. at 1215–16. The tenants sued a number of parties and settled all claims but their 
claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability. 
 179. Id. at 1216. 
 180. Id. at 1216–17. 
 181. Willard, 882 A.2d at 1216–17. (“Notwithstanding the fact that defendants had re-
ceived several written notices of the water problem from the state over a fourteen-year peri-
od, the trial court ruled that the [tenants] failure to give the [landlord] written notice of the 
alleged habitability defect pursuant to [the landlord tenant act] barred their claim.”). 
 182. Id. at 1216. 
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the notice provided by the state government as sufficient, holding that the 
express language of the statute required notice from the tenant.183 
The tenants appealed. The Vermont Supreme Court recognized that the 
state’s landlord-tenant law was enacted “partly in response” to the court’s 
adoption of the common law implied warranty of habitability standard in 
Hilder v. St. Peter.184 Therefore, the court was faced with the question: was 
the statute intended to supersede the common law implied warranty?185 
The court approaches the question as one of statutory interpretation.  
What defects did the legislature intend to cover? The plain language of the 
statute did not distinguish between patent and latent defects. Therefore, if 
the court adopted a plain language approach, the statute could be read as 
supplanting the common law implied warranty and requiring written notice 
as a prerequisite to seeking remedies for breach of the implied warranty. The 
dissent argued for this approach.186   
The landlord-tenant act was a response to and codification of the 
Hilder decision, the dissent reasoned, and should be read to abrogate the 
common law and set out the tenant’s sole remedy for breach of the implied 
warranty.187 Because the statute requires notice and an opportunity to cure 
prior to recovery, the failure to strictly satisfy these requirements is fatal to 
the claim.   
The dissent recognized that the outcome may seem harsh to tenants 
(particularly in this case),188 but their remedy is with the legislature and not 
the courts.189 The job of the courts is to apply the plain language of the stat-
ute as written. After all, the landlord-tenant act was an attempt to balance 
the rights and interests of landlords and tenants. The fact that, “[i]n respond-
ing to concerns of landlords, the drafting committee may well have gone 
further than necessary to protect their legitimate interest . . . are not grounds 
for refusing to apply a clear legislative requirement . . . .”190 In essence, this 
  
 183. Id. at 1217. 
 184. Id. at 1218 (citing Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984)). 
 185. Id. at 1217 (“The principle issue is whether plaintiffs may rely on the common-law 
implied warranty of habitability we recognized in Hilder v. St. Peter . . ., or whether the 
common law as stated therein was preempted by the Legislature’s enactment” of the state’s 
landlord tenant act). 
 186. Id. at 1226 (Dooley, J., dissenting). 
 187. Id. at 1227 (Dooley, J., dissenting) (“By its plain meaning, the statute covers both 
[patent and latent conditions].  Just as explicitly, it requires the tenant to give ‘actual notice of 
the noncompliance.’”). 
 188. In fact, the dissent indicates that the majority’s decision may have been based on 
“sympathetic to plaintiffs’ situation” rather than legal principles. Willard, 882 A.2d at 1226 
(Dooley, J., dissenting). 
 189. The dissent also notes that the tenants would have a claim under the traditional 
common law exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor—where the landlord fails to disclose 
a dangerous defect known to the landlord).  Id. at 1228 (Dooley, J., dissenting). 
 190. Id. at 1227. 
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interpretation sees the procedural notice requirements of the act equally as 
important and substantive as the tenant remedies provision.  
An alternate approach to strict construction—and the approach adopted 
by a majority of the Vermont court—was to interpret the statute in such a 
way that some claims that fall outside the statute continue to exist at com-
mon law. While acknowledging that the express language of the statute did 
not make any distinction between patent and latent defects, the court held 
that the law could be “logically understood to apply only to patent de-
fects.”191 Relying on legislative history, the court held that the legislators’ 
express concern was with regard to conditions unknown to the landlord, but 
known to the tenant.192 Because the legislators did not contemplate latent 
defects unknown to the tenant but known to the landlord, the court held that 
the notice provision did not apply.193 Therefore, the court held, the statutory 
notice and opportunity to cure requirements addressed only patent defects of 
the leasehold premises and not latent defects known to the landlord, and to 
hold otherwise would lead to a “patently absurd result.”194 
The Vermont opinion, recognizing claims independent of the landlord-
tenant act, leaves open additional, harder questions. First, and foremost, the 
court seems to be recognizing that, with regard to patent defects, the statuto-
ry scheme is the tenant’s sole remedy. If that is true, a tenant who reports a 
defect to the landlord but fails to do so in the manner required by statute 
(e.g.in writing or personally delivered), may find their claim dismissed. In 
addition, questions are certain to arise about the sufficiency of the notice—
even if it is given in the form required. For example, what if the tenant pro-
vides notice to the landlord about a water leak and inadequate ventilation in 
the bathroom and the tenant subsequently asserts a claim for breach of the 
implied warranty based on mold. The tenant never gave actual notice of 
mold. Should the landlord be considered to have constructive notice of mold 
when the notice was provided with regard to conditions that can lead to the 
development of mold? To put it another way, would the tenant’s claim fail 
for failure to give actual notice of what he ultimately claims to be the defect 
(mold), or would the landlord have sufficient notice because of the condi-
tions the tenant reported? A strict interpretation of the statute may require 
such claims to be rejected. A California court, applying the common law 
standard of breach, held that constructive notice was sufficient under these 
  
 191. Id. at 1218. 
 192. Id. at 1219. 
 193. Id. at 1218 (“The statute’s notice provision is designed to ensure that a landlord is 
not penalized for failing to fix a problem of which the landlord had no knowledge.”). 
 194. Willard, 882 A.2d at 1219. 
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facts.195 It is unclear how Vermont and other jurisdictions following the 
Vermont approach would decide the case. 
Not only can the adoption of the landlord-tenant act work to the disad-
vantage of tenants if a court rules that the common-law right has been super-
seded but, unsurprisingly, the statutes also tend to negatively impact tenant 
rights in those jurisdictions that have not adopted a common-law warranty. 
Courts in these states may be hesitant to create an independent cause of ac-
tion in the face of the statutory scheme. In those states, the tenant may be 
left to rely solely on the statutory claim and risk losing that claim by failing 
to strictly follow the statutory prerequisites. For example, in Roche v. Lin-
coln Property Company, the Fourth Circuit addressed a tenant claim for 
breach of the implied warranty of habitability applying Virginia law.196 The 
court dismissed the tenant’s claim, noting that Virginia does not recognize 
the implied warranty of habitability197 and that the tenant failed to adequate-
ly plead a cause of action under Virginia’s landlord-tenant act.198 
Another example of a court refusing to enact a common law remedy af-
ter legislative action is from Idaho—Jesse v. Lindsley.199 In Jesse, the tenant 
was injured when she fell into a sinkhole.200 She asserted a claim against her 
landlord for both violation of the landlord-tenant act and negligence.201 In 
Idaho, the legislature enacted a landlord-tenant law prior to the adoption of a 
common law warranty by the Idaho courts.202 The court held that because 
the legislature had acted, the legislative branch had preempted the field with 
regard to the rights and obligations of landlords and tenants, and the court 
refused to adopt an implied warranty of habitability as a matter of common 
law and would not change or expand traditional common law rules in the 
area of landlord liability.203 Because the tenant did not strictly comply with 
the notice provision of the landlord-tenant act—requiring written notice of 
the defect and three days to correct—she could not recover on her claim of 
  
 195. White v. Indian Oaks, LP, No. B208727, 2009 WL 692739, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2009) (“[W]e conclude that the evidence  creates a triable issue of material fact whether 
defendants’ actual notice of certain conditions in the apartment (conditions that defendants’ 
lease associated with mold growth) gave defendants constructive notice of the reasonable 
potential for mold growth in White’s apartment). 
 196. Roche v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 175 Fed. App’x 597, 603 (4th Cir. 2006) 
 197. Id. (citing Hutton v. Burke & Herbert Bank & Trust Co., 46 Va. Cir. 146, 147 (Va. 
Cir. Ct. 1998)). 
 198. Id. at 604(“[B]ecause the implied warranty of habitability is not cognizable under 
Virginia law, and because the plaintiffs failed to assert a separate claim under the VRLTA . . . 
we conclude that the district court correctly granted the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment.”). 
 199. Jesse v. Lindsley, 233 P.3d 1 (Idaho 2008). 
 200. Id. at 3. 
 201. Id. at 4. 
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. at 5 (citing Worden v. Ordway, 672 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Idaho 1983)). 
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breach. The court strictly construed what notice was required, finding that 
“[a]lthough Jesse did inform Lindsley of the defective condition a number of 
times, there is no allegation of her having given written notice. Thus, Jesse 
lacks standing to bring a claim under the statute.”204 
The question of to what extent statutory implied warranties will 
preempt or limit the common law implied warranty will continue to be an 
open question that each state will have to address. The landlord lobby will 
see an opportunity to turn back or limit the extent of liability not by con-
tracting what is considered “habitable”, but instead by seeking to increase 
the procedural hurdles a tenant must satisfy to have a valid statutory claim. 
This very well could be the next front in the landlord-tenant revolution (or 
perhaps better described as a counter-revolution).   
In those jurisdictions where the court determines that the statutory im-
plied warranty preempts the common law warranty, tenants will face addi-
tional hurdles and may find that they have a claim based on inhabitable liv-
ing conditions for which there is no remedy because they failed to satisfy the 
conditions set out in the statute. Such a holding certainly seems consistent 
with the reason the implied warranty was initially adopted—to put the bur-
den on the landlord to remedy substandard housing without being able to 
stand behind legal barriers. Rejection of the common law implied warranty 
essentially replaces the doctrine of caveat emptor with the doctrine of pro-
cedural avoidance. 
In those jurisdictions where courts determine that the common law im-
plied warranty exists as an independent claim, tenants may succeed without 
following the statutory procedures, which raises different concerns. Such a 
holding fails to recognize that landlord-tenant acts are often a compromise 
between various factions and contain set procedures and methods for a ten-
ant to assert a claim. For example, the legislative warranty may require a 
finding by a public body of a defect before a claim for breach of the statuto-
ry warranty can be asserted.205 Recognizing a separate common-law claim 
upsets this balance. In addition, such a holding also contradicts a primary 
purpose of the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act, which is to pro-
vide uniformity among the states. The recognition of common law claims, 
which will inevitably have different standards across the country, defeats 
that goal.   
  
 204. Id. at 5. 
 205. Holsman v. Carrick, No. HO33054, 2010 WL 1189596 (Cal Ct. App. 2010) (tenant 
unable to recover on statutory claim but stated a valid claim for breach of the implied warran-
ty of habitability). 
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V. THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY AS A MATTER OF EQUITY 
AND NOT CONTRACT 
An underlying logic in the adoption of the implied warranty of habita-
bility was that a residential leasehold was more akin to a contractual rela-
tionship than one based in property. Early courts were able to latch onto the 
property doctrine by calling the essence of a lease agreement the transfer of 
a bundle of goods and services and not the transfer of an interest in land.206 
This provided two critical conceptual hooks that gave the rationale for the 
warranty’s legitimacy. First, the ability to turn to the law of contracts and 
the already established doctrines that accompanied it made the transition an 
immediate legal foundation. As Professor Super explains, this provided a 
convenient, effective, and logical shortcut for courts: 
The lease, as amended by the implied warranty, became a contract be-
tween landlord and tenant. As with parties to other contracts, their rela-
tionship was to be symmetrical before the law. The courts had long pro-
vided landlords with a service essential to their businesses: [such as 
summary eviction proceedings]. The courts would now demand that, in 
exchange for this extraordinary help in requiring tenants to perform their 
legal obligations, landlords comply with the laws on health and safety.  
Contract law already had a host of principles for assessing performance, 
handling mutual breaches, measuring damages, and so forth. This al-
lowed the new legal regime to burst onto the scene fully formed, without 
the need for time-consuming articulation over series of cases that had 
been required to transform civil rights law and criminal procedure.
207
 
The second hook was comparing the grant of a leasehold interest to the 
sale of goods. If the transfer is more like goods and services, courts rea-
soned, then rules that apply to goods and services should similarly be ap-
plied to leaseholds.   
While using the contractual sale of goods analogy allowed courts to 
make the landlord-tenant relationship consistent with growing societal ex-
  
 206. Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“The city 
dweller who seeks to lease an apartment on the third floor of a tenement has little interest in 
the land 30 to 40 feet below, or even in the bare right to possession within the four walls of 
his apartment.  When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek ‘shelter’ today, they 
seek a well-known package of goods and services – [sic] a package which includes [sic] not 
merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing 
facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance.”); see also 
Steele v. Latimer, 521 P.2d 304, 308 (Kan. 1974); Foisy v. Wyman, 515 P.2d 160, 164 
(Wash. 1973). 
 207. Super, supra note 1, at 401. 
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pectations, the actual analogy was a strained one.208Consider these differ-
ences between the sale of goods under the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) and the landlord-tenant relationship. The common law implied war-
ranty of habitability covered both patent and latent defects throughout the 
term of the lease, while under the UCC the buyer has an obligation to in-
spect for patent defects and the seller does not have an on-going obligation 
to keep the goods sold in repair.209 The UCC allows for “as is” transactions 
while courts often hold that the implied warranty of habitability cannot be 
waived by contract.210 With regard to remedy, the UCC requires the pur-
chaser of defective goods to make a choice—either reject the goods or keep 
them and sue for damages.211 The implied warranty of habitability on the 
other hand, allows the tenant to remain in possession of the “goods”—the 
leased premises—and stop paying rent.212 
The point is that the relationship between the seller and purchasers of 
goods is fundamentally different from that of a landlord and tenant. There is 
an on-going relationship between the landlord and tenant that does not exist 
in the sale of goods.213 Professor Glendon concludes that the inherent differ-
ences between the sale of goods and the lease of property means that the 
“implied-in-law” lease terms such as the warranty of habitability are more 
akin to creating a regulatory scheme under the guise of contract doctrines.214 
Under this regulatory scheme, the question becomes, not what did the par-
ties agree (as it would be in a traditional contract dispute), but instead what 
reflects “ever-changing compromises among, and fluctuating perceptions of, 
the interests involved, as well as diverse views about the relationship of law 
to economic and social reality.”215 
While courts justified the implied warranty on private-contract 
grounds, the underlying goal was to do more than merely allocate the rights 
between two private parties to a contract, but to extend the warranty for 
broader social objectives.216 Some courts made the connection between 
  
 208. Glendon, supra note 58, at 547 (“It is clear even from Javins that the implied war-
ranty of habitability in residential leases has small resemblance to implied warranties in the 
sale of goods.”). 
 209. Id.  
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 548 (“A sale . . . is meant eventually to sever the seller’s connection with the 
goods and to make the buyer the owner.  A lease establishes an ongoing relationship between 
lessor and lessee, which, whether characterized as a property or contractual relation, is meant 
to be temporary, with all rights to be reunited with the lessor at some future time.”). 
 214. Glendon, supra note 58, at 549. 
 215. Id. at 550. 
 216. See Super, supra note 1, at 401 (adopting the implied warranty as a matter of con-
tract law “depend[ed] on the courts to hew fairly closely to established principles of contract 
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regulating landlord-tenant relationships in an effort to combat underlying 
societal ills explicit: “Permitting landlords to rent ‘tumbledown’ houses is at 
least a contributing cause of such problems as urban blight, juvenile delin-
quency and high property taxes for conscientious owners.”217 
Adopting the warranty of habitability as a creature of contract created 
problems for future courts because the lease-as-goods analogy is difficult to 
apply in individual cases. Furthermore, if the underlying goal of the warran-
ty is less contractual and more policy based, then courts will seek to find 
ways to loosen the burdens of proof required in traditional breach of con-
tract claims because the true purpose of the warranty is to create more equity 
between the landlord and tenant.  
So how do courts enforce equity while still maintaining a contract-
based analysis? They tend to do this in two primary ways. First by engaging 
in a very deferential standard of review on appeal, and second by imposing a 
lessened burden of proof regarding damages.218 The underlying presumption 
here is that courts utilize these methods to aid the tenant. While this is true, 
courts can always fall back to the contract principles—and require a higher 
amount of proof—when the court feels that equity is not on the tenant’s 
side. 
A. Enforcing Equity Through Law: The Deferential Standard of Review 
The standard of review in landlord-tenant disputes is extremely defer-
ential. Appellate courts say that the findings of the trial court, “[will] not be 
disturbed unless they are so wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of 
justice,”219 or that the trial court has “‘broad discretion’ to determine wheth-
er a particular condition is a material breach of the warranty of habitabil-
ity.”220 By recognizing an extremely deferential standard of review, appel-
late courts can find that a particular holding was within the discretion of the 
judge, even if there are valid arguments to challenge the court’s holding on 
the basis of inadequate proof—either of the breach of the implied warranty 
or of damages. 
  
law in deciding landlord-tenant disputes.  Their failure to do so in practice meant that one 
idiosyncratic legal regime, based on notions of estates in land, would give way to another, 
based on current public policy preference.”). 
 217. Pines, 111 N.W.2d at 413. 
 218. This article is of course limited to review of appellate decisions. There are likely 
other methods available at the trial court level as well. 
 219. Cohn v. Hinger, No. SC-2950-10, 2011 WL 6820293, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2011) 
(internal quotes omitted) (quoting Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483–
84 (1974)). 
 220. Pocasset Mobile Home Park, 2011 WL 1744114 at *2. 
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If courts are focused as much on ensuring equity and balance in the 
landlord-tenant relationship as they are in enforcing contract rights, such 
deference makes sense. After all, often these claims occur in small claims 
courts where the tenant is more likely to appear pro se than the landlord. 
These judges who hear the evidence and observe the landlord and tenant 
have the best chance to observe their credibility and reliability.   
Consider a recent New Jersey case Cohn v. Hinger.221 The tenant lived 
in the premises for the entire rental period and paid rent in a timely manner. 
During the tenancy the landlord decided to sell the property and had an in-
spection performed. The inspection (“serendipitously” the court says) dis-
covered the premises lacked proper electrical outlets, carbon monoxide de-
tectors, and that the basement had asbestos.222 During the tenancy there was 
also a water leak that made it difficult for the tenants to use the basement for 
approximately four months.223 The tenant brought an action against the land-
lord seeking rent abatement for these conditions. The trial court seemed very 
skeptical of the tenant’s motives in bringing the suit, inquiring why the ten-
ant did not put the rent into escrow and come to court sooner and comment-
ing, “And an argument could be made, I’m not making that argument, but an 
argument could be made by the landlord that if the tenant was so inconven-
ienced, why did he pay the rent every month? He could have put it in escrow 
with the Court.”224 Going on, the trial court says that the tenant presented 
“no evidence of specific damage.”225 These comments indicate skepticism 
on the part of the trial court toward the tenant—likely based on a belief the 
tenant raised the “inhabitable” conditions simply to recover rent already 
paid on a premises that the tenants had few complaints about during the ten-
ancy (they did complain about water intrusion into the basement). 
On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court upheld the trial court’s find-
ings—emphasizing the great deference given to the trial judge. The court 
then goes on to approach the concept of “habitability”—stressing that the 
concept means “suitability for living purposes; the house must be occupia-
ble. As such, not every defect or inconvenience will be deemed to constitute 
a breach of the covenant of habitability. The defect or problem must be such 
as to truly render the premises uninhabitable in the eyes of a reasonable per-
son.”226 Starting from this more stringent definition of habitability, the court 
had no problem holding that the tenants failed to show that any of the de-
fects “had a significant impact on their occupancy or safety.”227 This is so, 
  
 221. 2011 WL 6820293 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2011)(internal quotes omitted). 
 222. Id. at *1. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at *3. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at *5 (quoting Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 469 (1973)). 
 227. Cohn, 2011 WL 6820293 at *6. 
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even though it is certainly arguable that proper electrical outlets and carbon 
monoxide detectors are a part of the “goods and services” the tenant con-
tracts for—particularly when the lack of those items violates housing or 
building codes. The court dismissed the allegation that the trial court’s 
comments indicated a bias against the tenant for failing to pursue remedies 
sooner and the requirement that the tenants show actual damages.228 
Similarly in Elder Broach Properties, Inc. v. McNeel, the tenant rented 
a house from a church.229 The tenant complained of mold and mildew in the 
home. The church had an inspector examine the problem who confirmed the 
presence of “severe mold” (there was also a city inspection that also found 
the presence of mold).230 The church provided a humidifier but the tenant 
claimed it did not solve the problem. The tenants brought a claim for breach 
of the implied warranty of habitability—after they found a new home they 
wished to purchase. The trial court (with the appellate court affirming) 
found that the tenant, who they described as lacking credibility, did not es-
tablish his claim for breach of warranty.231 
The Cohn and McNeel cases demonstrate a situation where the tenant 
arguably demonstrated sufficient conditions to establish a breach of the im-
plied warranty, but the claims were rejected, relying on the deferential 
standard of review. However, this same deferential standard can work to the 
tenant’s advantage as well. Consider the Utah case Myrah v. Campbell.232 
The tenant brought a claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability 
as a counterclaim to a suit for rent. After hearing the evidence of the proper-
ty’s condition, the trial court found that the home was “uncomfortable” and 
“inconvenient” but that it was “certainly habitable.”233 However, in the final 
judgment the court granted “equitable relief” and offset what the plaintiff 
owed to the defendant based on the uncomfortable condition of the premis-
es. The Utah court of appeal, after citing to numerous cases discussing the 
“broad authority” of courts to grant equitable relief that are reviewed under 
an abuse of discretion standard, held that the equitable offset would not be 
disturbed.234 
  
 228. Id. (After noting that the trial court commented on the tenant’s failure to act earlier 
and the failure to bring forth proof of harm caused by the conditions, the court concludes that 
the “decision focused almost exclusively on the fact that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that 
the alleged defects had a significant effect on their occupancy or safety.”). 
 229. Elder Broach Props., Inc. v. McNeel, No. COA08-202 2008 WL 5221597 (N.C. Ct. 
App. Dec. 16, 2008). 
 230. Id. at *2. 
 231. Id. at *4. 
 232. 163 P.3d 679, 683 (Utah Ct. App. 2007).    
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 234. Id. at 685 (“At the end of the trial, the trial court concluded that the conditions in the 
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The point is not that these courts reached wrong outcomes, but that the-
se decisions are being made largely on the credibility of the parties, and are 
being upheld by appellate courts through reliance on a very deferential 
standard of review. In other words, when the equities are in favor of the 
tenant, the alleged defect is likely to be found to make the premises inhabit-
able. On the other hand, when the court is skeptical of the tenant’s credibil-
ity, they have no problem adhering to a more stringent definition of “habita-
bility” and holding in favor of the landlord. Perhaps in this area, where so 
many of the parties —particularly tenants —proceed pro se, an equity based 
ad hoc analysis of these claims is the best way to achieve the larger policy 
objective of eliminating substandard rentals and protecting the investment of 
legitimate landlords from tenants who are merely seeking to avoid paying 
rent. However, it should be acknowledged that these decisions are being 
made with reference to equity and not through application of contract prin-
ciples. 
B. Enforcing Equity Through Law: Proving Damages 
Perhaps the area where the break from contract doctrines is most pro-
nounced is with regard to damages. A breach of the implied warranty is a 
contract claim, with the underlying premise that the landlord has materially 
breached an implied term of the lease agreement and therefore the tenant 
should be excused from performing (paying rent) or should be entitled to 
damages.235 Two basic principles of contract seem to lose their meaning 
when they arise in landlord-tenant disputes. First, is the rule that a party 
seeking to prove damages must do so with “reasonable certainty.”236 The 
second is the rule that with regard to breach of contract actions, equitable 
remedies are inappropriate unless legal remedies would be inadequate.237 
Damages can be measured in one of two ways. The first is the diminu-
tion-of-value measure, in which the tenant can recover the difference be-
tween the property as warranted and the property in the condition that the 
tenant received it.238 A second measure is the cost of repair or to restore the 
  
evidence, we conclude the trial court did not exceed its broad authority in granting equitable 
relief.”). 
 235. Cohn v. Hinger, No. SC-2950-10, 2011 WL 6820293, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. Dec. 7, 2011) (“Generally speaking, because a breach of the implied warranty of habita-
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 236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352. 
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property to a habitable condition.239 Both of these standards require the ten-
ant to put on proof. 
When considering this burden through a purely contractual lens, we 
would expect that the tenant would put on proof of the amount and value of 
damages.240 However, in the landlord-tenant area there is no uniformity re-
garding the amount of proof of damages required from the tenant. Some 
courts merely require the tenant to put on evidence of the breach itself, and 
the court determines the amount of deduction that the tenant is entitled to. 
For example, in Pocosset Mobile Home Park, LLC v. Carvalho, a Massa-
chusetts appellate court upheld a 25% reduction in rent for the tenant where 
the landlord failed to properly maintain a septic system and the plaintiff was 
required to endure a “horrible septic smell.”241 Based solely on the tenant’s 
testimony related to the nature of the smell, the court determined that the 
tenant’s damages justified a 25% reduction in rent due.242 The court held that 
the trial court’s holding would not be disturbed “particularly in an area such 
as breach of habitability where quantification is merely impossible.”243 
It is surely not impossible to put on expert testimony (perhaps from a 
realtor or another familiar with the rental market in the area) of the value of 
a residence in a habitable condition, and the value of that same residence 
with the defect. Perhaps acquiring such evidence would be expensive or 
inconvenient, but it would not be impossible. In fact, some evidence would 
be expected in a traditional contract dispute. The standards applied in land-
lord-tenant actions make sense only when it is acknowledged that courts are 
not applying these standards as a matter of contract but as a matter of equi-
ty.244 
An example of this is a recent case out of California Holsman v. Car-
rick.245 The trial court found that the landlord breached the implied warranty 
of habitability and awarded the tenant $18,600. The appellate court agreed 
that the implied warranty was breached, but found that there was no evi-
dence in the record on how the damages were calculated. The court remand-
ed the case to the trial court for a determination of damages “in an amount 
the court deems appropriate and supported by the evidence previously pre-
sented.”246 The only evidence put forward by the tenant related to the condi-
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tion of the property; there was no evidence of the value of the premises “as 
warranted” and the appellate court makes it clear that additional evidence 
would not be allowed.247 Without additional evidence, the court is left to 
determine, based on its own conception of the value of the property what 
damages the tenant is entitled to. Such equitable discretion tends to makes 
the implied warranty a legal concept in name only and not in practice. 
It should not be surprising that, if equity is the guiding factor in the de-
cision of how much proof is necessary, courts will sometimes impose the 
traditional contractual burden on the tenant. As one court noted: “While it 
may prove to be too much to ask a plaintiff in the Small Claims Section to 
present expert appraisal evidence to compare the rental value of the premis-
es on the date of the inception of the lease with the rental value during the 
period of supposed breach of the implied warranty of habitability, we never-
theless view the present record as utterly barren of any evidence of valuation 
of damages whatsoever.”248 The bottom line is that these decisions are based 
upon the court’s view of equity and not any consistent application of legal 
principles. 
In sum, the adoption of the implied warranty of habitability as a crea-
ture of contract was never an easy fit. Courts have been left to determine 
how to deal with a doctrine where the legal rules that it implicated often 
worked counter to the underlying policy purpose of the rule. Courts have 
dealt with the issue by adopting an extremely deferential standard of review 
of landlord-tenant disputes. Trial courts are given a great deal of discretion 
to determine what breaches the obligation to provide a “habitable” premises 
and how much proof must be brought forward to establish damages. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is impossible to know what the next forty years holds for the implied 
warranty of habitability. Over the last forty years the implied warranty has 
been adopted in almost all jurisdictions as a matter of common law and/or as 
a matter of statute. The definition of what constitutes a “habitable” residence 
has remained remarkably consistent over the years – with very little evolu-
tion even though society itself has changed dramatically. Courts have begun 
to with how to legally reconcile the common law implied warranty and the 
statutory warranty. As these issues are reconciled, the symmetry between 
the rights and obligations of landlords and tenants produced by the implied 
warranty very well may be challenged or even skewed toward the landlord 
or the tenant. If that is the case, there may be a counterrevolution to bring 
the relationship back into balance. Finally, courts have had to deal with the 
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consequence of adopting the implied warranty as a matter of contract. The 
established contract doctrines—particularly relating to proving breach of the 
warranty and damages—are difficult to enforce both because they are so fact 
dependent and because the proof may be beyond the capacity of a tenant 
faced with inadequate housing to produce. This results in courts looking to 
principles of equity to decide landlord-tenant disputes while continuing to 
give lip-service to contractual doctrines. 
 
